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Harmonization in the Regulation of
Pharmaceutical Research and Human
Rights: The Need to Think
Globally
Ileana Dominguez-Urban*
As with many industries, the pharmaceutical industry is becoming a global
enterprise both in marketing prescription drugs and in conducting the
human research necessary to establish the safety and efficacy of those
drugs. The industry makes a significant contribution to health care: most
important new drugs in the past forty years have come from private
pharmaceutical companies.' However, the current regulatory system for
pharmaceuticals presents a number of problems for many nations. The
costs to pharmaceutical companies of duplicative research trials and
unnecessary regulation results in higher prices, delays in treatment, or the
unavailability of some drugs in some markets. At the same time,
pharmaceutical regulation is intended to protect consumers from unsafe
and ineffective drugs. How do nations achieve this goal yet still ensure that
research costs are not prohibitive? The trend has been to move beyond
national borders in order to find solutions to this dilemma. The current
international focus on "harmonizing" drug regulations as a way to reduce
the costs of drug development and provide earlier access to innovative
therapies is a necessary step. However, the focus should be broadened to a
global perspective.
Protection for human subjects of biomedical research has also become
a global concern. When research was a purely local endeavor, local
regulations for the protection of human subjects were adequate. For
example, the United States has a Very advanced and comprehensive set of
laws for protecting its population during the investigation and distribution
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1. MILTON SILvaoMAN Er AL., BAD MEDIcINE: THE PRESCRPnON DRUG INDUSTRY IN THE
THIRD WORLD 187-88 (1992) [hereinafter BAD MEDiciNE] (also describing the Soviet
Union's, China's and Cuba's approaches, which prohibit profits, as "almost a total
failure" at encouraging the discovery of important new drugs).
30 CoRNELL INTr'L J. 245 (1997)
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of pharmaceuticals. 2 However, research is no longer a local endeavor. The
U.S. pharmaceutical industry is the largest in the world;3 yet only 7.5% of
the 1,771 new drugs marketed in the United States between 1961 and 1987
were marketed first domestically.4 In 1986, approximately 18% of
research funded by U.S. companies was conducted abroad.5 Moreover, the
current trend to "harmonize" pharmaceutical regulations, by increasing
acceptance of research studies conducted abroad, so called "foreign data,"
or by adopting a mutual recognition procedure, will only increase the need
for regulations extending beyond national borders to protect human
subjects. Without such regulations the populations of developing
countries may be particularly subject to exploitation.
We have reached a period in history in which we must formulate our
laws with a global focus. We can no longer focus solely on local, state or
national regulatory schemes that do not "tak[e] into account the significant
role played by transnational forces embodied in multinational
corporations, global capital markets, and rapidly advancing technologies
and new scientific discoveries." 6 The lead article in a new law review
dedicated to the study of globalization observed that "[tioday, the line
between domestic and international is illusory. :. [so that] we need.., the
kinds of domestic legal reforms necessary to mesh with or respond to
global economic and political forces."7
2. See Anne E. Wells, Comment, Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs: A
Comparison of the United States and France, 13 Loy. L.A. IrrT'L & COMP. LJ. 393, 399
(1990); FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, Appendix C, Report of the Subcommittee on Medical Devices,
Radiological, Health & Biomedical Research C18 (May, 1991) [hereinafter EDWARDS
CoMITErE REPORT] (indicating that the "FDA is the world leader in consumer
protection"); Henry G. Grabowski, Regulation and the International Diffusion of
Pharmaceuticals, in THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF MEDICINES: IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.
REGULATORY REFORM 5, 7 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1980) (indicating that "[r]egulatory
controls over new pharmaceuticals began much earlier in the United States than in
Europe, and... consistently have been more stringent in scope and intensity than those
abroad); Eric M. Katz, Europe's Centralized New Drug Procedures: Is the United States
Prepared to Keep Pace, 48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 577, 578 (1993) (indicating that "the [FDA]
has enjoyed the luxury of world leadership regarding the regulation of new drug
development, review, and postmarket surveillance."); Anne E. Wells, Comment,
Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs: A Comparison of the United States and France, 13
LoY. LA. INT'L & CoMp. LJ. 393, 399 (1990) (citing INsTrTUT OF MEDICINE-NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ScIN cFs, CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, at 137 (1988)).
3. Kathleen Johnson, United States, in INTERNATIONAL PHRMACEUTICAL SERVICES:
THE DRUG INDUSTRY AND PHARMACY PRACTICE IN TWENTY-THREE MAJOR COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 603, 616 (Richard N. Spivey et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES].
4. Id. at 617. The FDA has made significant improvements in its drug approval
process and has significantly reduced drug approval times, particularly in reviewing
applications for "new molecular entities," those which represent new drug products as
opposed to reformulations, new combinations, or new dosages of previously approved
products. Peter H. Rheinstein, Significant FDA Approvals in 1995, 53 AMER. FAM. PHYs.
1871 (1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File.
5. Johnson, supra note 3, at 617.
6. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: An Introduction, 1
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1993).
7. Id.
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This Article will concentrate on two aspects of human rights
implicated in the regulation of pharmaceuticals: first, the effect of the
regulatory process on the availability to consumers of safe and efficacious
drugs, and second, the use of human subjects for clinical drug trials or
investigational research.8 The need to distribute potentially beneficial
drugs to the sick as expeditiously as possible and the need to protect
research subjects are competing forces.9 In Part I, this Article will describe
the interdependency of world health care and the globalization of the
pharmaceutical market, and will advocate that pharmaceutical products be
regulated with a global focus. Part II of this Article will describe the
international movement to harmonize pharmaceutical regulations, its
origins, and goals. Part III will recommend that, in keeping with global
human rights concerns, including the need to ensure that safe and
efficacious drugs are available to consumers on a global basis, "total
harmonization" should not be the goal of harmonization efforts. Part IV
will address the effects of harmonization on human subjects in
international research, and will advocate greater international protection
for subjects through the development of binding, minimum standards,
which should include obtaining informed consent and proceeding with
human subject research only after oversight by representatives of the
scientific and lay communities.
I. Pharmaceutical Regulation and World Health as Global Concerns
The need for a globalized response is evident in the pharmaceutical indus-
try. A global focus is needed not only because of the significant presence
of multinational companies' 0 and the world-wide market for industry
products," but also because of the inter-relationship among nations in
combatting diseases such as the world-wide AIDS epidemic. 12 The most
8. The human rights addressed in this Article may also be affected by patent
hostility and price controls if they decrease drug availability or cause pharmaceutical
companies to withdraw from some particular markets or to engage in less innovative
research. See BAD MEDicrm, supra note 1, at 52; Clive Cookson, Health-Cost Cuts Are a
New Inhibition-Regulation, FIN. TimEs, July 23, 1991, at IV. Sometimes, human rights
may also be implicated in the work environment due to exposure to toxic substances,
but this activity is governed by an entirely different regulatory mechanism. See
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
9. Wendy K. Mariner, AIDS Research and the Nuremberg Code, in TH NAZI DocTORs
AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN ExPEIMmNrATION 286, 294 (George
J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter NAZI DocroRs].
10. Shoji Kodama, Pharmaceutical Firms Revising System to Monitor Drugs, NIKKEI
WKLY., Jan. 18, 1992, at 8 (describing multinationals as especially well positioned "to
benefit" from harmonization).
11. Id. (describing pharmaceuticals as high-tech products which, like electronics
equipment, have "vast global potential"). See also Rosemarie Kanusky, Pharmaceutical
Harmonization: Standardizing Regulations Among the United States, the European Commu-
nity, and Japan, 16 HouSroNJ. INrL L. 665, 707 (1994).
12. See Evelyn M. Gentemann, Comment, After School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline: Employees with AIDS and the Concerns of the "Worried Well," 37 Am. U. L. Rzv.
867, 870 n.7 (1988). See also BAD MEDIciNE, supra note 1, at 6.
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"globalized" responses to date are the industry-led efforts to harmonize the
requirements for registration of pharmaceuticals. 13
When dealing with an emerging legal concept, it is important to
ensure that a common nomenclature is in place. If "globalization" means
the extension of the operations of firms in "developing, producing and sell-
ing goods and services outside their home country," 14 then the pharmaceu-
tical industry is well on its way to globalizing.' 5 Instead, if speaking of the
juridical or regulatory level, and if globalization means something other
than internationalization, 16 then globalization 17 of pharmaceutical regula-
tion has not yet occurred. Indeed, some argue that there is no globaliza-
tion of law and that the world is currently facing disintegrative forces that
equal or exceed the integrative forces. 18 Internationalization "refers to
cooperative activities of national actors, public and private, on a level
beyond the nation-state but in the last resort under its control" like matters
"made the subject of bi- or multilateral cooperation." 19 "[Gilobalization as
distinct from internationalization denotes a process of denationalization of
clusters of political, economic and social activities." 20 While the process of
harmonizing pharmaceutical regulation is an international endeavor, the
very idea of mutual recognition of a drug's approval is a move toward dena-
tionalization. Whether or not globalization can and will occur, the present
international harmonization effort can be seen as a strong integrative step.
In fact, the industry's continued globalization and the trend of interna-
tional legal activities will only serve to heighten global concerns and the
need to adopt global solutions to address these concerns.21 Regional agree-
ments such as NAFTA and international agreements such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are expected to increase globalization in
the drug marketplace,22 and correspondingly to increase the need for regu-
latory agencies to consider the "international health and safety implica-
tions"23 of these agreements.
13. See infra text accompanying footnotes 4247.
14. Claudio C. Tarabusi & Graham Vickery, Globalization and Pharmaceuticals,
OECD OBSER ER, Dec.-Jan. 1993, at 41 n.2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
15. Id.
16. Jost Delbrfick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domes-
tic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993).
17. Id.
18. Benjamin R. Barber, Global Democracy or Global Law: Which Comes First?, 1 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 119-24 (1993) (describing international law as "soft law,"
i.e., composed of non-binding legal principles which are not accepted as obligatory, and
lacking in effective enforcement mechanisms because power is always exercised by indi-
vidual nations).
19. Delbrack, supra note 16, at 11.
20. Id. at 10-11.
21. Id. at 11 ("[Ildeally, globalization is to serve the common good of humankind, e.g.,
the preservation of a viable environment or the provision of general economic and social
welfare.").
22. Positive Outlook for OTC's in Latin America, tLE, Nov. 15, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
23. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrTEE ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRA-
TION 52 (May, 1991) [hereinafter EDWARDS Co mm= REPORT].
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Many of the issues raised by the current industry practice and regula-
tion raise global concerns; health is a global concern. The problems
caused by drug shortages, use of inferior, expired or misprescribed drugs,
and inadequate or ineffective medical supervision are not merely local
problems. For instance, antibiotics in developing countries are frequently
used in inadequate dosages and for too short a treatment period, resulting
in inadequate treatment for the local population and creating drug-resis-
tant strains of bacteria.24 These bacteria become impossible to treat as
they invariably spread throughout the world.25 Physicians and patients in
the United States also contribute to the development of drug resistant
strains of bacteria, inter alia, by misusing antibiotics for viral infections.26
Another example of how the health concerns of nations are interre-
lated is in the therapeutic value of medicinal products made from local
flora and fauna, most of which are to be found in the Third World.27 In
addition, the failure of the existing pharmaceutical systems to cure prevent-
able and treatable diseases of the Third World 28 has health care implica-
tions for citizens of the developed world who travel abroad as tourists,
diplomats, business people, or soldiers.29 Finally, the lesson we are learn-
24. BAD MEDiciNE, supra note 1, at 7, 45.
25. See Lawrence K Altman, Mechanism Explained for Drug Resistance in Some TB
Strains, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1994, at C4; Exotic Diseases Waiting to Burst on the World,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 4, 1993, at 8 (reporting on drug resistance to bacteria, including
those present in pneumonia, gonorrhea, urinary tract infections, wound infections, and
TB).
26. Michael D. Lemonick, The Killers all Around, TimE, Sept. 12, 1994, at 63, 67;
Richard Saltus, Return of the Germ, 13 Am. HEALTH 72, 1994 WL 13047876, at *3-4, *14.
See also Joan Stephenson, Fighting Infectious Disease Threats via Research: A Talk with
Anthony S. Fauci, 275 JAMA 173, 174 (1996) (discussing whether external restraints
should be imposed on physicians because "[m]any infectious disease experts have
warned about overuse and misuse of antibiotics by physicians, which has encouraged
the emergence of resistant strains of microbes.").
27. Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE LJ.
223, 223-25 (1993) (describing drugs developed from a Madagascar plant which have
helped to increase the remission rates in various cancers, and the signing of the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity as a means of providing compensation in exchange for the
country's protection of these "biodiversity sources"). See also MichaelJ. Huft, Comment,
Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of Intellectual Property
Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1678 (1995).
28. See BAi MEOicINE, supra note 1, at 4, 7, 161-75 (describing the situation as due to
several factors, not just multinational corporate concerns with the bottom line, and gen-
erally improving as of the mid-1980s when Ciba-Geigy responded to the health crisis in
the Dominican Republic through its Servipharm program). The industrialized nations,
representing 25% of the world's population, consume 86% of the total drug supply,
while the 75% of the population in the Third World accounts for the remaining 14% of
the available drug supply. Id. at 4. Although the situation is improving slightly, except
in Africa. Id. at 5. AIDS is perceived as a serious threat to world health, yet more people
die each month from any one of several treatable or vaccine-preventable diseases such as
malaria, measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. Id. at 6.
29. Of course, the global problem of contagious diseases cuts both ways; developing
countries may also be subject to contagion brought from abroad. Ren-Zong Qiu, What
Has Bioethics to Offer the Developing Countries, 7 BioETHics 108, 125 (1993) (attributing
the current AIDS pandemic partly to importation from foreign tourists attracted to the
"sex industry" of the host country).
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ing in examining national health care delivery systems about the old adage
that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is equally applicable
to global health care needs.30 We can pay some now to improve global
health care delivery systems, or we can pay a lot more later.31 In order to
solve these problems we need a greater level of international cooperation
than has existed.32 Given that the pharmaceutical industry needs a global
market to obtain a return on investment,33 and that the regulations of
other countries affect the domestic interests of producer and consumer
nations, our perspective on pharmaceutical regulation must be global if we
are to adequately protect human rights.
This Article will address the basic human right34 concern of "freedom
from harm,"35 in this case, externally imposed harm. It is the same right
which authorizes, and some would say demands,36 that governments enact
criminal laws and punish criminal offenders, in other words, it is the gov-
30. See Brent L. Davis & Michael J. Wagner, Top 10 Trends to Expect from Clinton's
Health Care Plan: Field of Insurers Will Narrow Further, CoR'. LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1994, at
20.
31. Sue Baker, Third World; Study Says Acts of Man Make Natural Disasters Worse,
UPI, Nov. 19, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File (quoting from a Red
Cross report which concludes that most disasters are unsolved development problems).
32. Ren-Zong Qiu, supra note 29, at 125.
33. David W. Jordan, Note, International Regulatory Harmonization: A New Era in
Prescription Drug Approval, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 500 n.197 (1992).
34. For a more thorough discussion of the source, definition, and scope of human
rights, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN OUR TIME (Marc F. Plattner ed., 1984) (providing
several essays defining and examining human rights); MYREs S. McDouGAL ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGrrs AND WORLD PUBLIC Oiu 211 (1980). Although the Article posits and
supports the existence of this basic human right, it is not intended to provide a compre-
hensive demonstration of the existence, scope or source of this right. Professor James
A.R. Nafziger suggested in a personal communication that the author might find support
for the existence of this right in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 3), G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), which states that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty,
and security of person," or in Article 12 of the United Nations' Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, which includes the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health," International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 12, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Even in the absence of
such a right, each nation should reach the same conclusions about protecting its own
citizens-as consumers and as research subjects-on the basis of sound public policy.
Moreover, the global nature of health problems-particularly infectious diseases-and of
the pharmaceutical industry require sound public policy include consideration of the
citizens of other countries.
35. See Joan Claybrook & David Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of Regulation: Disclos-
ing the Auto Safety Payoff, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 87, 121 (1985).
36. M. Cheriff Bassiouni et al., An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in Interna-
tional Law and Practice: The Need for International Regulation of Human Experimenta-
tion, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 1666 (1981) (stating that "[tihe obligation of
states to regulate their activities in order to prevent and suppress unlawful conduct and
to express the universal human concern with a category of activities whose potential for
abuse is revealed by history and the uncertainties of modem medical science and tech-
nology is uncontestable"). See also New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115
U.S. 650, 663 (1885) ("The wants of the public are often so imperative that a duty is
imposed on the government to provide for them.").
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ernment's authority to regulate for the "public health, safety and wel-
fare."37 This right extends to protection from harm by other private
citizens, as in the case of criminal laws or protective regulation. It also
extends to protection from government activity which causes harm to citi-
zens, such as torture.38 Thus, in this Article the term "human rights" is
used to refer to the need of the public to be protected from harm in the
health care area, particularly in the regulation of pharmaceuticals.
Focusing on the human rights impact of national and international
pharmaceutical regulation is apropos because of the significant current
international developments in the regulation of pharmaceuticals, as well as
recent renewed international interest in the ethical issues raised by human
experimentation,39 and the growing interest in ethical issues relating to
research on minority populations and research conducted in developing
countries.40 In addition, since developing countries are expected to pres-
ent a significant, growing market for pharmaceutical products, the actions
of the developed countries involved in the harmonization process will have
a significant impact beyond their borders.41 Thus, pharmaceutical regula-
tion implicates the need to examine the global, human rights impact of
international harmonization efforts on the availability of safe and effective
medicines, as well as the adequacy of human rights protection for subjects
of biomedical research in light of increasing international pharmaceutical
research.
37. The authority arises out of the "police power," the power "to place restraints on
the personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the public
safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general pros-
perity." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1985). See State v. Mosley, 708 P.2d
1022, 1025 (Nev. 1985) (stating that "the authority to provide for health, safety and
welfare of the citizen is inherent in the police power of the State without any express
statutory or constitutional provision").
38. Carnes Lord, Human Rights Policy in a Nonliberal World, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN OUR
TmIE 125, 133. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709-10 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 686 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority's holding that active
duty serviceman could not sue government for money damages for injuries arising from
his being an unwitting participant in secret Central Intelligence Agency LSD experi-
ments, in violation of the Nuremberg Code).
39. See generally INTERNATIONAL Sumnmrr CONFEmENCE ON BioE-mics, TowARDs AN
INTERNATIONAL ETHIC FOR RESEARCH wrrH HuiAN BEING (1987) (Ottawa, Canada) [herein-
after ToWARDs AN INTERNATIONAL ETHIC]. See also WHO Guideline on GCP, PHAtAcEm=.
CAL Bus. Nevs, Feb. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (describing
World Health Organization Efforts to set "globally applicable standards" for biomedical
research on humans).
40. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 120-139.
41. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, UN=TED NATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 135-36 (1984)
[hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS]; Optimization of Global R & D Strategy,
MARu~rLErrm, Apr. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (listing Latin
America and Southeast Asia). See also BAD MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 231-32 (predicting
little growth in the pharmaceutical market of developed countries and describing the
Third World market as untapped).
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II. International Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Regulations
The present efforts to harmonize drug regulation laws began in 1990 with
an agreement between the Commission of the European Communities, the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Japanese Ministry
of Health and Welfare, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Indus-
try Associations, the United States' Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Associa-
tion, and the Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association to jointly
sponsor an International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH).42
This unprecedented undertaking brought together the regulatory agencies
and regional pharmaceutical associations representing a majority of the
world's producers and consumers of pharmaceuticals. 43 The key objective
of this industry-led conference was to reach agreement "on an action pro-
gramme to complete international harmonisation (1991-1996) with a view
to prevent[ing] unnecessary repetition of human and animal testing and to
reduc[ing] pharmaceutical research and development costs."44 The fourth
ICH is planned for the week ofJuly 16-18, 1997,45 and all signs point to an
on-going harmonization process extending well beyond 1997. Although
complete harmonization is a remote possibility, participants such as the
pharmaceutical companies and critics of the FDA would like it to happen.
The ultimate goal of ICH is to put safe and effective drugs in the hands of
consumers without undue delay. 46 Thus, the ICH effort responds to
increased concern about the high and rising cost of research and develop-
ment and its effects-including the possibility that drug availability and
innovative research will be inhibited.
The problems of high drug development costs and duplicative testing
requirements are not unique to the ICH participant countries. Pharmaceu-
tical industry representatives also met recently to discuss the issue of regu-
latory harmonization in Latin America, and of truly world-wide
harmonization.47 The consensus was that harmonization should be pur-
sued through regional alliances such as the Andean Pact, Mercosur and
CARICOM.48 Representatives from the Andean Pact nations and the Pan
American Health Organization have met to discuss harmonization strate-
42. Commission of the European Communities, IP, May 10, 1990, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Rapid File.
43. The EC, Japan and the United States account for 75% of world pharmaceutical
production and 90% of world research and development activities. Jordan, supra note
33, at 492. The prescription drug market for the three is estimated to be 79%. Leigh
Hancher, Competition and the European Pharmaceutical Market, 37 ANrrrRusT BULL. 387,
387 (1992).
44. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 42. In Europe, "harmoniza-
tion" is sometimes spelled "harmonisation;" this Article uses the American spelling
except when the quoted material or citation uses the British spelling.
45. ICH Steering Committee Expert Groups Meet, Mam -rxmrr, May 13, 1996.
46. Kodama, supra note 10, at 8.
47. Positive Outlook for OTC's in Latin America, supra note 22 (stating that Latin
America presently has more than 20 drug regulatory systems, but great potential for
harmonization).
48. Id.
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gies.49 Countries in other regional alliances, such as the Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation, have discussed regional harmonization of
standards.50 Still, to the extent that developing countries seek to develop,
manufacture, and export pharmaceuticals, they will be affected by the har-
monization activities at ICH. Moreover, research needs to be conducted in
developing countries to resolve the pressing health needs of their citizens,
which differ from the health priorities of developed countries, and which
are not being addressed by existing research. Harmonized standards gov-
erning human research set by the ICH countries may discourage many of
the world's scientists from conducting research abroad if the standards are
too strict or burdensome.
A. The Total Harmonization Prescription
Just as visionaries in the 1970s thought the computer would herald the
advent of a paperless society,51 the prophets of drug harmonization envi-
sion a world where only one round of research trials is performed.52 How-
ever, total harmonization requires overcoming obstacles created by
different medical and cultural traditions, as well as opposition led by some
national pharmaceutical industries.53 There will always be some differ-
ences in clinical testing requirements due to wide differences in medical
practice and social conditions.5 4 In addition, the recent recognition that
research trials performed on one population may not provide sufficient
protection for the targeted patient population stands in contraposition to
efforts to achieve total harmonization. 5
One proposal, particularly favored by industry, entails a mutual recog-
nition process whereby the drug is submitted for approval in one country.
Subsequent approval by that country would be recognized by all others in
49. Id. The CARICOM countries have already taken regional action on pharmaceuti-
cals. See Health Against Profits in Drug Abuse Battle, LATIN AM. ECON. REP., Mar. 30, 1979,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (describing regional efforts to reduce
prices and increase drug availability).
50. Peter Gill, Australia: APEC Pact on Harmonisation of Standards, Ausm. FIN. REV.,
Apr. 14, 1993.
51. Andrew Beven, Paperless Dreams Buried by Office Reams, THE GuAIAIN, Oct. 7,
1992, at 15.
52. Cookson, supra note 8, at IV ("Total harmonisation would mean that a company
would need to carry out only one set of scientific tests, animal experiments and human
trials, in order to apply to register a new drug anywhere in the world."). See also Delthia
Ricks, In Pursuit of Drug 'Harmony,' Om.ANDo Sar'numL, Oct. 28, 1993, at A3 (reporting
on the second International Conference on Harmonization held in Orlando). Article
refers to the Conference's goal of "expediting the global availability" of new drugs so as
to permit instant U.S. approval of "medications tested and approved abroad." Id.
53. Peter O'Donnell, Many Trials on the Long Road to Harmony in Drug Testing, FIN.
TIMES, May 27, 1993, at 4.
54. Cookson, supra note 8, at IV. Still, some believe a country like Japan could insist
that a new drug be tested on Japanese patients only when that special requirement is
based on "rational criteria.". Id.
55. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat.
122, 133-35 (1993) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 289a-20) (providing that NIH sup-
ported research must include women and members of minority groups unless doing so
would be inappropriate). See also infra text accompanying notes 120-139.
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the alliance.5 6 This proposal, however, is criticized by consumer groups
which generally view a mutual recognition process as presenting the dan-
ger that a company will choose the most lenient national regulatory system
for introduction of a new drug; instead, they call for "upward harmoniza-
tion"--use of the highest national standards.5 7
III. Pharmaceutical Regulation in ICH and Developing Nations -
Regulating for Safety and Effectiveness
National regulation of pharmaceuticals has a long history. For example,
England enacted the first law attempting to control drug quality in 1540.58
The United States first took action against quack remedies and unlabelled
products containing alcohol, cocaine, or opium in 1906.59 However, it was
the 1937 "sulfanilamide elixir" disaster which led to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA)-the first attempt to require drugs to be
tested for safety and labelled for use.60 Drugs sold pursuant to a doctor's
prescription were exempted from these requirements by a 1951 amend-
ment 61 until the thalidomide disaster led to the 1962 Kefauver-Harris
amendments to the FDCA,62 establishing the basic regulatory mechanism
still used today to ensure drug efficacy and safety. 63 The ensuing publicity
revealed that neither drug manufacturers nor prescribing physicians knew
much about the effects of the drugs that patients were taking.64
Prescribers then, as now, relied on information supplied by the manufac-
turers, information which sometimes was based on inadequate testing or
on fraudulent claims.65 The amendment subjected all new drugs to FDA
approval before they could be imported, manufactured, distributed or sold
56. Louis H. Orzack et al., Pharmaceutical Regulation in the European Community:
Barriers to Single Market Integration, 17J. Ha.TH POL POL'Y & L. 847, 859-61 (1992).
57. Id. at 861.
58. M.F. Cuthbert et al., The United Kingdom, in CONTROLLING THE USE OF THERAPL-
TIc DRUGS 99 (William M. Wardell ed., 1978).
59. JAMEs ROBERT NIELSEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERaL DRUG LAw 4 (2d ed. 1992).
60. Id. at 5-6 (covering drugs "introduced in interstate commerce"). In 1937 a small
manufacturer decided to market one of the infection-preventing "sulfa" wonder drugs in
a syrup base. Unfortunately for the 107 men, women and children who were reported to
have died from ingestion of the "sulfanilamide elixir," the syrup base was composed of
diethylene glycol, the same slightly sweet product used today for automobile antifreeze.
Id.
61. Id. at 7-8.
62. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Star. 780 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355).
63. NIE.SEN, supra note 59, at 8. Thalidomide had been available abroad as a sleep-
ing pill until the discovery that use during early pregnancy frequently resulted in severe
deformities to the fetus. A pregnant woman who had purchased the drug abroad left the
United States to have an abortion rather than risk giving birth to a "deformed child." Id.
Prior to 1962, use of thalidomide was still under investigation by the FDA in the United
States; only a few infants were injured because of the drug's availability as physician
samples. See id.; BAD MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 210.
64. NIELSEN, supra note 57, at 8. See also DAVID J. RoTMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BED.
sIDE A HISTORY OF How LAw AND BIoETHIcs TRANsFoRmED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 86-
87 (1991) (regarding the discovery that physicians were administering experimental
drugs without informing patients).
65. NIELSEN, supra note 59, at 8.
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in the United States.66
As Justice Felix Frankfurter indicated, the policy behind this extensive
regulatory mechanism is based on the fact that drugs "touch phases of the
lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modem industri-
alism, are largely beyond self-protection." 67 Through the first half of this
century, concern for human rights concentrated on the consumer. The pri-
mary concerns about therapeutic drug use are that it might prove to be
directly harmful or that it might prove to be ineffective and thus result in
time and money wasted by sick individuals who might forego alternative
treatments. 68 Recently, attention has also focused on the human "cost" of
delays in drug approval. 69
A. Indications for Harmonization
A "Single Market" has been readily established for most products in the
European Union, but not for pharmaceuticals. 70 The European Union
("EU") began moving toward a harmonized drug regulatory policy in
1965.71 Despite continuing attempts to create either a mutual recognition
procedure or a single regulatory mechanism for approval of pharmaceuti-
cals, the EU member states have acted under disparate, autonomous regu-
latory mechanisms. 72 However, in 1993 the EU did establish a centralized
system for evaluating medicine through a newly created superordinate
agency which began operating in 1995. 73 The centralized system exists
66. Id. at 3.
67. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
68. 1 JAmrs T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 13.01 (2d ed. 1993).
69. See, e.g.,John Patrick Dillman, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Diseases:
Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 VA'D. L Ray. 925, 934-38 (1991); Dale
Gieringer, Twice Wrong on AIDS: The F.D.A. Frustrates Victims, N.Y. TMaEs, Jan. 12,
1987, at A21. There is a great deal of dispute about the extent of this cost. See, e.g., BAD
MEDiINE, supra note 1, at 211-13 (suggesting that drastic estimates of the cost of regula-
tory delay are largely hyperbole). See also id. at 213 (listing a number of drugs which
have had to be recalled and describing Great Britain's faster drug approval process as
requiring many more product withdrawals). There is also some disagreement with the
view that the United States is the slowest of the "sophisticated" drug" producing nations.
See, e.g., Rosemary P. Wall, Comment, International Trends in New Drug Approval Regula-
tion: The Impact on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 10 RuTGERs CoM'PuTER & TECH. LJ. 317,
328 (1984) (indicating that Japan has the most stringent regulatory process because
foreign drugs are not available in Japan until they have been approved in the country of
origin and must in any event be re-tested in Japan).
70. E.C. Commentaries, Coopers & Lybrand, Mar. 3, 1994, at 1- 2, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AlHwld File. This report attributes the delay to cost control and
national public health measures. Id. at 1.
71. Leigh Hancher, The European Pharmaceutical Market: Problems of Partial Harmo-
nization, 15 EuR. L. Ray. 9, 12 (1990).
72. Id. at 12-17.
73. EMEA Reports Successes in Inaugural 1995, MARImTLErrER, Feb. 5, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; E.C. Commentaries, supra note 70, at 7. Most
pharmaceutical manufacturers will be able to proceed under either this centralized sys-
tem or under a re-vamped de-centralized mutual recognition procedure. Id. There is
some indication though that while the EU has in theory finally reached accord on a
workable harmonized regulatory scheme, in practice, at least in the view of industry
officials, the trend is in the opposite direction-toward imposition of more individualized
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alongside a decentralized mutual recognition system which is supervised
and arbitrated by the same agency.
While the regulatory systems in some European countries are gener-
ally considered to be faster at approving drugs and to place greater empha-
sis on post-marketing surveillance, it is not clear that patients are better
off.74 Although the U.S. system seems to delay the introduction of some
efficacious drugs, the number of drugs whose marketing approvals in
Europe have been withdrawn after severe adverse reactions, including
deaths, is used by supporters to defend the FDA's slower regulatory sys-
tem.75 However, a harmonized and centralized European drug approval
process may exacerbate the so-called "drug lag;" pharmaceutical compa-
nies may initially bypass the United States and submit their new products
to the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA)
in order to bring the product to market quickly and recoup their develop-
ment costs.
76
In Japan, a purely national focus presents its own barrier to the mar-
keting of new pharmaceutical products to Japanese consumers. The Japa-
nese drug approval process has been described as seemingly "designed to
protect local pharmaceutical companies as much as Japanese patients" 77
because of its insistence on extensive testing in Japan.78 After the SMON
affair 79 Japan enacted stringent drug approval requirements. 80 However,
like the United States,81 Japan is also becoming more receptive to the use
of foreign data.82
and unique requirements by the member countries. See Pharma Industry's Need to
Regain Credibility, MARKELErrm, Mar. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File; EC Single Market "Hype" Warning, MuAErLm, Mar. 9, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
74. Testing Time for Drugs, EcoNo is-r, Aug. 7, 1982, at 69, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File.
75. See id. (listing such a situation with the anti-arthritic drug, Opren).
76. See Eric M. Katz, Europe's Centralized New Drug Procedures: Is the United States
Prepared to Keep Pace, 48 FooD & DRUG Lj. 577 (1993). See also Elizabeth M. Ruther-
ford, The FDA and "Privatization"-The Drug Approval Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 203,
223 (Anniv. Ed. 1995) (indicating that the "threat [to] the FDA's [regulatory] preemi-
nence" posed by European regulatory competition will spur agency efforts to harmonize
drug regulations and avoid needless duplication); Comment, FDA Reform and the Euro-
pean Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 Hv. L. REv. 2009, 2021 (1995) (indicating that
the result may be "an even greater 'drug lag'").
77. Clive Cookson, Drug Industry Still Healthy, FiN. TiMEs, Nov. 21, 1990, at 37.
78. Clive Cookson, Prescription for Success, FIN. TImEs, Dec. 3, 1990, at VII. The
industry is described as becoming more accomodating in view of the overseas expansion
of Japanese companies. Id.
79. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
80. Wall, supra note 69, at 328.
81. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
82. Cookson, supra note 77, at 37. As of 1990, the Ministry of Health and Welfare
was described as "becoming more willing to accept toxicity tests and preclinical data
from overseas" but still "insist[ing] on Japanese clinical data before it will consider any
new drug." Id. The Article noted that one sign of progress was the upcoming approval
of the contraceptive pill for use in Japan after three decades of use in the United States
and Europe. Id.
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The pharmaceutical'regulations of the more than one hundred devel-
oping countries with their diverse governments, laws, and cultures need
not be fully described here.83 However, it is significant that most develop-
ing countries apparently rely on the regulatory processes of the developed
countries through use of a certifcation scheme which permits the drug's
use in the developing country if the drug has been approved for use in the
country of manufacture.8 4 This certification scheme, adopted to combat
the dumping of untested, ineffective or dangerous products on the markets
of developing countries,85 is not an ideal solution. When a consumer
country lacks facilities to monitor pharmaceutical use, proniulgation of
pharmaceutical products under a safe-until-proven-otherwise presumption
can be a significant problem;8 6 the certification scheme encounters diffi-
culties with pharmaceuticals from nations whose regulations are too lax
(ineffective or dangerous drugs marketed) or too stringent (effective treat-
ments delayed or unavailable). Furthermore, reliance on a certification
scheme may exacerbate a situation about which developing countries have
long complained-the lack of treatments geared to the health needs of
developing countries.8 7 A manufacturer may have no incentive to test a
drug and subject it to the regulatory process of a country where the drug is
unlikely to have much of a market.88 Instead, certification will tend to pro-
vide consumers in developing countries access to drugs marketed to meet
the needs of, and tested on, consumers in developed countries. Consumers
in developing countries with their own regulatory approval process may be
no better off if pharmaceuticals must be subjected to yet another review
process with its own idiosyncratic requirements.
Although pharmaceutical products are developed and marketed inter-
nationally, if not globally, they are currently regulated only at the national
level. The focus of these national regulations has been on establishing the
safety and effectiveness of new products. The FDA, in particular, has been
lauded for its role in protecting consumers from unsafe and ineffective
products. National regulations can reduce the possibility that unsafe or
ineffective products are introduced into a particular country. However,
national regulations can also create significant barriers to pharmaceutical
83. The state of the pharmaceutical industry and of drug regulation in developing
countries varies widely. TRANSNATONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 41, at 11. The most
advanced countries engage in manufacture of active ingredients, processing of raw prod-
ucts, and conduct research for developing new drugs. Id. Those countries, which can
meet a substantial portion of their own drug requirements and sometimes export to
other countries, include Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Mexico and South Korea.
BAD MEuicmm, supra note 1, at 44. Yet many developing countries lack the financial
resources and technical skills to set up the necessary testing facilities. Ellen N. Cone,
Note, International Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: The Role of the World Health Organiza-
tion, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 331, 348 (1983).
84. Cone, supra note 211, at 349-50 (describing the development and functioning of
the WHO recommended scheme).
85. Wall, supra note 69, at 329.
86. TRANSNATIONAL CoaPORnAroNs, supra note 41, at 31.
87. Wall, supra note 69, at 329.
88. Id. at 329-30.
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availability. Until recently, new pharmaceuticals were required to be tested
and approved in every major market where the drug was to be sold.8 9
B. Patient Warnings-Drug Availability and Human Rights
The duplication of effort and requirement of compliance with diverse
national regulations increase the costs of new drugs to the consumer and
may result in delays of product entry into countries with more stringent
drug approval mechanisms or small markets.90 Although the treatment of
human subjects in pharmaceutical research has long been recognized as a
human rights issue,91 until recently little attention was paid to the human
rights issues created by the regulatory process. In the United States, the
FDA perceives its regulatory role to be based on "good science and con-
sumer protection." 92 However, there is an inherent tension between requir-
ing safety and developing new, effective drug therapies.93 This tension has
led the terminally ill to challenge both the delays in the process and the
legitimacy of government regulation altogether.
In the 1980s, for example, the FDA's regulatory process came under
attack because of the lack of available treatment for AIDS, the FDA's per-
ceived contributions to the drug lag, and the high cost of drug develop-
ment.94 For the first time, unexplained or unnecessary delays in the drug
approval process were seen as human rights issues. In response to public
pressure, the FDA changed its regulations to allow terminal patients
greater access to promising drugs, even though the required scientific test-
ing and regulatory review processes had not yet been completed.95 AZT
was one of the drugs which received this fast track treatment because the
initial studies suggested it was effective in combatting AIDS.
The AZT story, however, also reveals the need to conduct research in a
systematic and scientific manner. Overemphasizing the needs of the indi-
vidual patient for promising treatments can ultimately be detrimental to
society and to that class of patients96 because the purpose of the investiga-
tion-determining whether the drug is effective-may be compromised. The
findings in the AZT study about the drug's true effectiveness are questiona-
ble because the study was contaminated by outside factors, such as mem-
bers of the placebo group obtaining AZT on their own.97 Blurring the line
89. Kanusky, supra note 11, at 667 and passim; Nancy E. Pirt, The Regulation of the
Export of Pharmaceuticals to Developing Countries, 25 DuQ. L. REy. 255, 267 (1994).
90. Kanusky, supra note 11, at 667, 703-07 (1994).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 137-58.
92. Ronald Podraza, The FDA's Response to AIDS: Paradigm Shift in New Drug Policy?,
48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 351, 351 (1993).
93. Klaus von Grebmer, Commentary, in THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF MEDICINES:
IMPUCATIONS OF U.S. REGULATORY REFORM 59, 61-62 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1980).
94. See generally Podraza, supra note 92.
95. See Id. at 361-67.
96. See Podraza, supra note 92, at 356 (describing the tension between the patient's
right of self-determination and the collective interests of all patients).
97. Linda Marsa, Toxic Hope: Widely Embraced, the AIDS Drug Is Now Under Heavy
Fire, L.A. TIMS MAG., June 20, 1993, at 14. Research subjects are not required to take
the placebo instead of seeking treatment since they can withdraw from the study at any
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between research and treatment can also be detrimental to patients them-
selves when they put their hopes on one drug as "the cure" despite serious
side effects from that drug, and when science is unable to verify their
beliefs because the experiment is not properly controlled.98 Later evidence
revealed that AZT, a highly toxic drug with very severe adverse effects, is
not tolerated by many AIDS patients and may provide only transitory bene-
fits because the virus develops a resistance to AZT.99 Moreover, only four
out of every hundred patients achieve the anticipated benefit of a slower
progression of the disease. 100 Thus, relaxing the regulatory process by
allowing AIDS patients access to AZT may have led many to rely on a drug
that was nowhere near as effective as it initially promised to be.
The AZT story also contains a warning about the dangers to consumer
safety of streamlining the regulatory process too much. With AZT, the
usual toxicity studies were not completed and the clinical trials were halted
early when AZT demonstrated some benefit, despite reports of method-
ological problems with these studies. 1 1 Thus the FDA's allowing AZT to
be widely available to patients before completion of the regulatory process
may have been a mistake for reasons of safety and effectiveness.
While inefficiencies in the regulatory process and a continuing re-eval-
uation of the endorsed research protocols are legitimate areas of focus, a
complete abrogation of pharmaceutical regulation is not in the best inter-
ests of individuals or society. If experimental drugs are widely available, it
will be "impossible to determine which drugs do and do not work" because
controlled research will be impossible. 10 2 While some individuals will
have fortuitously come across the "right" drug, many others will not, and
they will have wasted time on ineffective or harmful drugs. If, as with AZT,
most patients place their hopes on the first drug which shows promise,
they may forego other new treatments and new innovations altogether.
Without a significant subject population to test new treatments, the safety
and effectiveness of other potential cures will not be established unless the
initial treatment is proven to be ineffective. No one will be able to identify
the safe and effective drugs, and society will be worse off.10 3 "Most people
are not in a position to evaluate the risks and benefits of an experimental
substance, especially when science is uncertain about them. Thus, society
has an obligation to identify therapeutic measures and to prevent exploita-
tion of and harm to its members."' 0 4
time. In this case the patient-research subjects put what they thought were their own
interests ahead of society's need to know whether the drug is effective, without dropping
out of the study.
98. See id. at 28.
99. Id. at 32-33.
100. Id. at 33.
101. Id. at 28.
102. Mariner, supra note 9, at 295.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 296. Some, however, would abolish entirely such "paternalistic" measures
as drug regulation and automobile safety standards. Id.
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Before achieving total harmonization, the ICH nations must grapple
with the issue of how much testing is required before a conclusion can be
reached that a drug is safe and effective and should become available as a
treatment. Currently, ICH participants hold widely divergent views on this
issue. For instance, not only does France not require a randomized, con-
trolled study, French researchers view placebo-controlled studies as "cruel
and inhumane" since the patients receiving the placebo have "no chance of
surviving." 10 5 In contrast, American scientists do not believe a drug's effi-
cacy can be proven until after such a randomized controlled study has
been carried out.10 6
The French view of controlled studies also presupposes that, at least
with respect to terminal patients, those receiving the drug (the treatment
group) are better off. A recent clinical trial which resulted in several deaths
among the treatment group underscores the fact that automatically assum-
ing the treatment group is better off may be overly simplistic. 10 7 Determin-
ing how much testing should be required is partly a policy issue, but it is
primarily a question for science. The prevailing scientific view is that with-
out randomized controlled studies, causality cannot be proven.10 8 Other
105. Wells, supra note 2, at 403.
106. Id. at 412. Randomized controlled studies are designed to determine whether a
drug's seeming effectiveness is caused by some factor other than the drug, particularly
the psychological effect known as the placebo effect whereby patients who believe they
are taking an effective drug will in fact feel better. Michael D. Green, Legal Theory:
Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
Ray. 643, 646-47 (1992).
107. Lawrence L. Altman, Fatal Drug Trial Raises Questions About 'Informed Consent,'
N.Y. Tn~is, Oct. 5, 1993, at C3.
108. Stephanie C. Austin et al., The History of Malariotherapy for Neurosyphilis: Mod-
ern Parallels, 268 JAMA 516, 518 (1992) (claiming that because randomized controlled
trials (RCT's) were never carried out no one knows whether malariotherapy is effica-
cious in the treatment of neurosyphilis); Mary M. Dunbar, Shaking up the Status Quo, 46
FOOD DRUG. & CosM. LJ. 673, 680-81 (1991) (indicating that for some researchers
RCT's are necessary to a determination of drug efficacy, while for others they are the
"gold standard"); Kenneth F. Schulz et al., Assessing the Quality of Randomization from
Reports of Controlled Trials Published in Obstetrics and Gynecology Journals, 272 JAMA
125, 126-27 (1994) (indicating that "[riandomized controlled trials provide the most
valid basis for the comparison of interventions in health care.... Thus, for readers to
have justifiable confidence in the internal validity of a trial, the report should demon-
strate adequate randomization."); Kenneth F. Schulz, Subverting Randomization in Con-
trolled Trials, 274JAMA 1456, 1456 (1995) (supportingJAMA's emphasis on RCT's and
indicating that empirical evidence "supports the importance of adequate randomiza-
tion"); Paul D. Stolley & Tamar Lasky, Malaria Therapy: The Value of the Randomized
Controlled Trial, Reply to Criticism, 269JAMA 211, 212 (1993) (indicating that presently
efficacy of a treatment cannot be demonstrated without a randomized control trial). See
also Charles Marwick, Philosophy on Trial: Examining Ethics of Clinical Investigations,
260 JAMA 749, 749-50 (1988) (interviewingJohn Fletcher who suggests that randomiza-
tion is not only ethically permissible, but may be ethically required under the justice
principle because it produces the most scientifically valid results and distributes the
risks and benefits of the study "as fairly as possible over the whole population of those
participating.").
Randomized controlled trials are the best method to prove causation, whether it be
proving that the drug causes the beneficial effect anticipated, i.e., is effective, or that the
drug causes other unanticipated and harmful effects, i.e., is not safe. Unless a cause and
effect relationship is demonstrated, it will not be dear whether the observed effect
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types of research can only give correlational information which would
require a much longer time frame before a decision on drug effectiveness
could be reached at the same comfort level as under a randomized study.
We should not abandon controlled studies unless doing so would be in the
interests of good science-a determination which has not yet been made.
The U.S. drug approval process has been described as biased towards
an assurance of safety prior to marketing approval.10 9 Some of the Euro-
pean regulatory systems are "more flexible" in pre-marketing regulations,
but regulate more heavily in the post-marketing phase. 110 One benefit of a
post-marketing regulatory phase is its ability to catch adverse reactions that
show up only with prolonged use, or, like the DES tragedy, 1 1' manifest
themselves only years later.112 Whatever the duration of pre-marketing
clinical research requirements, there will always be some adverse reactions
that are not discovered in the research phase; thus, total safety cannot prac-
ticably be achieved. Moreover, the longer the research phase, the longer
the delay in the drug's availability to the public. There may also be some
negative information on drug efficacy, such as drug tolerance, which can
only be discovered through post-marketing surveillance.
Therefore, one way to reduce the time needed before a drug is
approved, and still ensure safety and effectiveness, would be for the FDA to
reduce pre-marketing research requirements, and employ post-marketing
surveillance more effectively, as is done in Europe. In essence, the drug's
marketing phase would become another long-term study of a wider, more
varied population.113
(whether harmful or beneficial) was caused by the drug or some other factor. Moreover,
all drugs cause some side effects and every decision to approve a new drug requires a
risk-benefit analysis in which the drug's apparent effectiveness is weighed against its
apparent safety. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. Thus, basic information
about the drug's safety is needed prior to approval. However, not every adverse effect
that will result from wider use of the product can be detected in the clinical trials; thus
safety cannot be assured entirely through pre-market testing. David Kessler, Introducing
MEDWatch: A New Approach to Reporting Medication and Device Adverse Effects and
Product Problems, 269 JAMA 2765, 2765 (1993). Thus conducting randomized con-
trolled trials is important for reasons of effectiveness and safety, but this type of pre-
market testing is implicated more in concerns over a drug's effectiveness.
109. SeeJordan, supra note 33, at 484-88 (describing various factors which play a role
in this systemic bias). The mechanisms for drug approval in the United States and vari-
ous countries, have been described elsewhere. See Wall, supra note 69, at 323-30
(describing processes in the United States, Great Britain and Japan); Johnson, supra note
3, at 619-20.
110. See Grebmer, supra note 93, at 59-61 (describing an incident in which the Ger-
man newspaper, Der Spiegel, published an article attacking a drug company for continu-
ing drug trials when the trials had indicated the drug reduced mortality).
111. In the case of DES (diethylstilbestrol), safety problems were not discovered until
women whose mothers took the drug while pregnant developed vaginal cancer. See, e.g.,
Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925-26 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
112. Wall, supra note 69, at 325.
113. A Faster Track for New Drugs, FiN. Timms, Dec. 9, 1991, at 20, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File; Testing Time for Drugs, supra note 74, at 65.
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If time and cost savings are to be achieved, this would entail, at the
very least, reducing the duration of randomized controlled studies. If
safety is to be assured, the regulatory process would have to be capable of
withdrawing drugs from the market speedily after undesirable adverse
reactions are identified. 114 However, the prospects in some countries for a
harmonized regulatory policy that places greater emphasis on post-market
surveillance are less than ideal. In the United States, few doctors report
adverse reactions to the authorities, and, as a result, a post-marketing sur-
veillance system would be ineffective 15 absent a national paradigmatic
shift. It is not clear which system would be more cost-effective, as a
number of factors come into play. While post-market surveillance might be
cheaper for the regulatory agency (and the pharmaceutical firm), a shift to
more post-market oriented regulation might shift the costs of research to
patients, their insurers and other health care payors (which may well be the
government).
For many developing countries, post-marketing surveillance is not fea-
sible. For those countries which lack basic health care resources and have
very few doctors for large segments of the population, such post-marketing
regulation is nearly impossible. 116 For those countries which rely entirely
on the producer nations' regulatory decisions to allow marketing, there
would be less protection from unsafe and ineffective drugs with a system
balanced in favor of post-marketing surveillance. Some of the ICH partici-
pants have recognized the special needs of developing countries. 117 A
solution to the regulatory problems of these countries cannot be achieved
without a global focus on harmonization activities and international
cooperation.
Similarly troublesome are the prospects of harmonizing drug approval
through a mutual recognition system without a uniform system of regula-
tion. Mutual recognition would provide less protection for those countries
which continue to emphasize pre-marketing approval. First, pharmaceuti-
cal firms would likely seek approval in the countries with the least pre-
marketing surveillance and then simply seek recognition of the approving
114. See A Faster Track for New Drugs, supra note 113, at 20.
115. Id.
116. Health expenditures in the Third World are "appallingly low." BAD MEDICINE,
supra note 1, at 4. WHO sources estimate that half a billion people are suffering from
tropical diseases and live in countries with an average per capita income under $400
and average annual government health care expenditures of $4 per person. Id. For a
description of the lack of health care personnel and resources in many developing coun-
tries, see generally id. at 1-8. There's also some indication that some physicians in
developing countries report positive results without following research protocols. See
infra note 170.
117. See Japan Orphan Drug Promo System, MARKErLE R, Oct. 4, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (describing statement of Japanese official that devel-
oping countries have responsibilities towards the rest of the world). See also BAo
MEDICmN, supra note 1, at 237 (quoting then FDA associate commissioner, Stuart
Nightingale).
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country's decision in all other nations.11 8 Second, all countries without
effective post-marketing surveillance would have to rely on the post-market-
ing surveillance system of the approving country. This approach is
unlikely to detect genetic, dietary and other local differences. 119 A central-
ized approval system would either prolong the testing process in order to
take these differences into account, or it would similarly need to rely on a
uniform system of post-marketing surveillance being in place. Therefore, in
order to adequately protect humans from harm, adoption of a mutual rec-
ognition or centralized regulation process requires a harmonized regula-
tory system with an agreed-upon emphasis on pre- and post-marketing
surveillance in place throughout the world.
C. Contraindications to Total Harmonization-Ethnic and Other Factors
Recently, attention has focused on the tendency of pharmaceutical
research conducted in the United States to rely on homogeneous subject
populations, primarily "middle-aged white men" in carrying out clinical
trials. 120 As a result of this practice, when drugs are approved for human
consumption, physicians must "guess whether new findings can be extra-
polated to the rest of their patients."12 ' "[F]or most classes of drugs, no
one knows if ethnic variations in drug metabolism exist, or where they
have been seen, as with f-blockers and antidepressants, what the full extent
of their clinical relevance might be."122 Similarly, some male-only studies
of heart disease resulted in dietary recommendations which actually
increased the risk of heart disease for women. 123
If differences exist in the way different ethnic groups react to certain
drugs, then a research protocol which excludes that group may miss not
only the side effects of that particular drug, but may result in a significant
positive effect being missed altogether (i.e., a false-negative result). These
issues raise equity or justice concerns, 124 but to the extent that the effect of
inadequate pre-marketing research essentially becomes post-marketing
experimentation, 125 which is likely without proper disclosure, the situa-
118. Comment, FDA Reform and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HAxv.
L. REv. 2009, 2024 (1995) (indicating that dominance of the pharmaceutical companies
on the world health market may lead regulatory agencies in a mutual recognition system
to "engage in a competitive 'race to the bottom' of the regulatory pool").
119. See infra notes 120-139 and accompanying text.
120. Paul Cotton, Is There Still Too Much Extrapolation from Data on Middle-aged
White Men?, 263 JAMA 1049, 1049 (1990).
121. Id. The situation leaves some physicians wary of prescribing these drugs alto-
gether. Id.
122. Id. See also Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single White Male for Medical Research, 22
HAsTNGS CEuN, REP. 24, 26 (Jan-Feb., 1992) (stating that "normal" lithium dosages
when given to African-Americans produce toxic reactions due to physiological differ-
ences); Comment, FDA Reform and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HAuv.
L. REv. 2009, 2024-25 (1995).
123. Dresser, supra note 122, at 27.
124. Id. ("The justice principle mandates fair distribution of the benefits and burdens
of biomedical research.").
125. See Sue V. Rosser, Re-visioning Clinical Research: Gender and the Ethics of Experi-
mental Design, 4 HYPmn 125, 129 (1989). See also R. Alta Charo, Protecting to Death:
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don raises concerns about both beneficence 126 and autonomy based prin-
ciples. The problem of pharmaceutical data based on a population which
is not representative of the ultimate consumer is not unique to U.S. based
research. 127
To the extent that drugs tested elsewhere will be marketed in the
United States, the same issues will arise with respect to both efficacy and
safety. Until recently countries including the United States and France
required that regulatory approval be based on domestic data, i.e., research
conducted on citizens of the country where regulatory approval is
sought.128 Although the FDA recently expanded the circumstances under
which it would accept foreign clinical data, it recognized the need to
require that the foreign data be "applicable to the U.S. population and U.S.
medical practice"' 29 because "medical, genetic, and cultural differences
between countries" present "unique problems not associated with domes-
tic data."130
That cultural, genetic, medical, dietary or lifestyle factors may affect
drug interaction is suggested by recent international experiences with
some drugs. For instance, a multi-nation epidemiological study of the con-
troversial analgesic and anti-pyretic, dipyrone, which had been linked to
the development of certain fatal blood diseases, found that use of the drug
had no negative effect on patients in Israel and Budapest, but increased the
risk of developing these fatal side effects by five times for patients in Milan
and Sofia and by twenty to thirty times for patients in Ulm, Berlin and
Barcelona.' 3 ' These disparate results generated much controversy and
criticism. However, the investigators were all respected scientists and the
disparities were never fully explained, except for the possible occurrence of
geographic and ethnic differences. 132 In some countries, dipyrone is dis-
pensed more often than aspirin, over-the-counter, and without any indica-
tion of these side effects.' 33
In Japan, the development of a fatal nervous system disease was associ-
ated with prolonged use of clioquinol, an anti-diarrheal agent.134
Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical Research Trials, 38 ST. Louis U. LJ. 135, 152 (1993).
Dresser states that the choice is not about "protect[ing] women and people of color from
research risks. Instead the choice is whether to expose some consenting members of
these groups to risk in the closely monitored research setting, or to expose many more
of them to risk in the clinical setting without these safeguards. ... " Dresser, supra note
122, at 27.
126. Dresser, supra note 122, at 27.
127. See, e.g., Kodama, supra note 10, at 8 (describing Japanese concerns over the lack
of clinical tests on the elderly despite an increasingly elderly patient population).
128. Wells, supra note 2, at 403.
129. 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)(1) (1994).
130. New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (1985). The issue is
apparently still on the agenda for regulators involved in the ICH process. See Ricks,
supra note 52, at A3 (noting that working groups want to ensure that the drug approval
process includes testing of the drug's effects on different ethnic groups).
131. BAD MEuIcINa, supra note 1, at 93-94.
132. Id. at 93-97.
133. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 41, at 33.
134. Id. at 32.
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Although isolated cases have been reported throughout the world, Japan
was the only country faced with an epidemic: 10,000 people were stricken
by 1970.135 The disease, dubbed subacute-myelo-optico-neuropathy
(SMON) often led to paralysis of the legs, acute gastrointestinal problems,
blindness, and even death.136 Many of the patients had been taking clio-
quinol regularly. Although the evidence for other patients was contradic-
tory or incomplete, the outbreak in Japan ended shortly after clioquinol
products were withdrawn from the market. 137 The product is considered a
"public menace" in Japan and has been withdrawn in the United States, the
United Kingdom and the Caribbean.138 Other countries, including Brazil,
Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Venezuela, consider the
product safe and essential for public health.139 The dramatically different
experiences with clioquinol use have never been fully explained.
For all the foregoing reasons, harmonization in the regulation of
pharmaceuticals cannot be achieved in a manner consistent with protecting
human rights throughout the world unless the proper balance between the
rights of the patient and society is achieved. Nations and regulators must
determine the degree of scientific testing required before a legitimate con-
clusion can be reached about a drug's safety and effectiveness. Proposals
for harmonization also raise the need to determine something we know
very little about: how local and genetic differences affect drug interactions
and how these differences can be recognized in a harmonized procedure.
Since the problem is greater for developing nations relying on studies con-
ducted in developed countries, these nations need to take a more active
role in the developments at ICH.14°
D. The Prudent Harmonization Prescription
There is no such thing as an effective drug without side effects.141 Conse-
quently, a "safe" medicine is one which has a positive benefit to risk ratio.
That benefit to risk analysis varies over time, from country to country, and
from region to region within any given country. ' 42 The analysis will also
depend upon the needs of the society and of the individual patients suffer-
ing from the ailment for which a cure is sought. Given that these tensions
are inherent in the analysis, determining what degree of testing is required
135. The accounts began with two Argentine physicians in 1935 who reported that
patients they had treated with dioquinol had developed severe nerve damage. BAD
MEDIclNE, supra note 1, at 192-193.
136. Id. at 193.
137. Id. at 193-94.
138. Id. at 21.
139. Id. at 21-23. An Egyptian investigation of the SMON situation could not find a
single case of SMON despite heavy clioquinol consumption in the country. Id. at 23.
140. A related concern, the limited applicability of data tested on younger subjects for
an increasingly older patient population, has already been addressed at ICH. See The
Community, the US and Japan Participate in Conference on Harmonisation in the
Pharmaceuticals Sector, AGENcE EuuoPE, Nov. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File.
141. TRANSNATiONAL CORPORATIOfS, supra note 41, at 31.
142. Id.
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to establish a particular risk to benefit assessment will involve both scien-
tific and policy questions. In all events, policy decisions must be based on
a scientifically valid and workable regulatory system.
Until the FDA began accepting foreign data to support applications for
approval of new pharmaceutical products, there was little likelihood of
harm to consumers from unsafe and ineffective drugs. On the other hand,
unnecessary delays and duplication of costs are also harmful to consumers
if they delay consumers access to safe and effective drugs. Harmonization
efforts seek to reduce the harms of delay and duplication but present other
potential sources of harm.
Some ICH participants and observers have called for total harmoniza-
tion.143 Total harmonization would involve one of two schemes, a central-
ized approval procedure or a mutual recognition procedure. A centralized
approval procedure would have to rely on either protection through pre-
marketing approval, as the FDA does, or protection through post-marketing
surveillance, as in some European systems. A system based on the FDA's
regulatory scheme would ensure safety and effectiveness, but would result
in delayed approval for new pharmaceutical products in all ICH countries.
A system emphasizing post-marketing surveillance would provide speedier
access to new pharmaceutical products, but could not guarantee safety and
effectiveness unless effective surveillance could be achieved.
In the United States, a significant barrier to effective post-marketing
surveillance is the failure of the medical establishment to follow up and
report on effectiveness and adverse reactions. 144 There may also be gaps
resulting from a failure of patients to communicate with their physicians.
This practice would have to be changed and a mechanism for gathering
and analyzing post-market data would have to be implemented. The FDA
currently has no power to require physicians to report on drug response or
adverse reactions. The health care market is extremely decentralized and is
primarily regulated by the states. FDA enforcement is based on the
agency's ability to withhold or withdraw marketing approval from the man-
143. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
144. Gerald A. Faich, Adverse Drug Reaction Monitoring, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1589,
1591-92 (1986) (indicating that "[t]he rate of adverse-reaction reporting in the United
States is far below that in many other developed countries" and that physicians have a
moral duty to report suspected adverse reactions); Doug Podolsky, Dangerous Drugs:
What You-and Maybe Your Doctor-Don't Know About Your Prescription's Side Effects
Could Hurt You. Or Even Kill You., U.S. NEws & Woau REP., Jan. 9, 1995, at 48, 51-52
(indicating that physicians "come up short at reporting adverse drug reactions, despite
prodding by FDA chief David Kessler"). "[One] factor inhibiting physician reporting is
that it is not an ingrained practice-it is not in the culture of U.S. medicine to notify the
FDA about adverse events or product problems. In other countries such as the United
Kingdom, adverse drug reporting is more frequent." Kessler, supra note 108, at 2765
(citing a study which reported that only 1% of serious events are reported to the FDA
and emphasizing the importance of postmarket reporting of adverse effects to ensure
product safety since many adverse effects probably will not be identified during pre-
marketing investigations). The MEDWatch program, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,046 (1994), has
improved reporting of adverse reactions, but at a 10% reporting rate is still only
"scratching the surface." Linda Marsa, Hey, Who Needs a Prescription?, L.A. TIMEs MAG.,
Sept. 29, 1996, at 10, 30.
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ufacturer. Effective post-market surveillance would have to be achieved
through either concerted action by individual states or national action to
control the practices of health care entities, particularly prescribing physi-
cians. One possible solution would be to alter the FDA's regulatory pro-
cess so that after positive pre-marketing clinical studies, the FDA can
provide conditional marketing approval to a pharmaceutical. The initial
marketing phase would serve as a post-market "field study." As a condition
of marketing the drug, the pharmaceutical company would have to require
physicians to report drug response, dosages, adverse reactions, complica-
tions, and the like. The pharmaceutical industry and the medical commu-
nity would have to recognize that preliminary marketing of the drug is
experimental and that proper informed consent must be obtained from
patients.
For many developing countries which are not participants in the ICH
process, but are affected by it, post-marketing surveillance may be econom-
ically impossible in light of scarce resources and the significant health care
needs of their populations. These countries would have to rely on the post-
marketing surveillance of ICH participating countries. Reliance on post-
marketing surveillance by other countries may be ineffective in detecting
ethnic, dietary, or cultural differences.
These differences may result in adverse drug reactions by the consum-
ers of developing countries which are not manifested in the consumers of
developed countries. Ethnic differences may also result in the failure to
identify a drug which would provide an effective remedy to one ethnic pop-
ulation, because testing in a different ethnic population masked favorable
results.
A mutual recognition procedure would only exacerbate ethnic differ-
ences. Mutual recognition could also lead to wholly inadequate pre-market
testing if pharmaceutical developers are allowed to seek approval in the
countries with the most lax regulatory oversight. Thus, to ensure that safe
and effective drugs are speedily made available to consumers a prudent
and thoughtful approach which takes into consideration the effects of har-
monization on the protections provided to all citizens of the global health
care market is needed. All regulatory bodies must act in concert under
equivalent standards in order to prevent the "dumbing down" of regulatory
review. These standards must take the possibility of ethnic differences into
account in the pre-marketing phase in order to protect consumers in poor
countries. These decisions must be based on good science and good
policy.
IV. Pharmaceutical Regulation-Protection of Research Subjects
Even if the science and policy issues of protecting consumers can be
worked out, human rights issues raised by pharmaceutical experimenta-
tion remain. The pharmaceutical industry already conducts research
abroad. The recent trend toward greater acceptance of foreign data and the
efforts to harmonize drug regulations can only lead to more research being
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conducted abroad. As is the case with manufacturing and regulatory
capacity, developing countries have limited capabilities for conducting
research.145 Pharmaceutical research is the predominant type of research
using human subjects. 146 Considering the global dimensions of health
and pharmaceutical research and marketing, to what extent can the coun-
tries involved be assured that this research is being conducted ethically?
Presently, national regulations have very little extra-territorial effect, and
international guidelines have not been widely accepted 147 and have no
enforcement mechanisms.
Current regulations for protecting human subjects have roots in the
Nazi war-time experiments and the resulting "Doctor's Trial" at Nurem-
berg.148 Still, attention in the United States turned to the human rights of
research subjects only in the 1960s and 1970s.149 In 1966, the FDA and
NIH responded quickly to the publicity generated by the disclosure of
unethical conduct during a cancer study at Jewish Chronic Disease Hospi-
tal, 150 and the published expos6 by Henry Beecher, a respected physician
and researcher at Harvard Medical School, of widespread, unethical
145. TowARDs AN INTE mAT-oNA. ETHIc, supra note 39, at 69 (statement ofJos6 Barze-
latto of the WHO, noting that the problem of lack of research on tropical diseases can
only be solved through international efforts to expand the research capabilities of devel-
oping countries).
146. Id. at 39.
147. Id.
148. See generally NAzi DocTORs, supra note 9; George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark:
The Nuremberg Code in the United States Courts, 7 J. CorNm p. HEALTH L. POL'Y 17
(1991).
149. Although the health agencies in the federal government, the Public Health Ser-
vice and the National Institute of Health, had considered the need for regulating human
subject research as early as 1945, nothing was done for two decades. JAMES H. JONES,
BAD BLOOD: THE TuSKEGEE SYPHILS ExPImEr 188 (1981). This was due partly to the
fact that the Nazi experiments were perceived to be the isolated and aberrant actions of
deranged individuals. Id.
150. See JAY KArz, EXPERIMENTATION wiTH HUMAN BEINGS 9-65 (1972). In July, 1963,
three physicians, with the approval of the director of medicine at Brooklyn's Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital, injected live cancer cells into twenty-two chronically ill
patients. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (N.Y. Sup.
CL 1964), rev'd, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), rev'd, 206 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y.
1965) (affirming the trial court's decision to order disclosure of the records). The sub-
cutaneous injections of these non-cancerous, but otherwise debilitated, patients were
intended to demonstrate that the slower rejection rates of cancer patients similarly
injected was due not to their debilitated state, but to their cancer. The experiment, con-
ducted under the auspices of the Sloan-Kettering Institute and financed by the U.S. Pub-
lic Health Service, created controversy among the hospital's physicians, three of whom
chose to resign rather than to be seen as endorsing the experiment. Another physician
reported the matter to the medical board of the hospital and eventually to the board of
directors. There were allegations that the 18 patients were unable to consent because
they were mentally incompetent and that informed consent had never been sought.
When the board of directors took no action on the matter, a dissenting board member
sued to obtain disclosure of the hospital's records alleging that the board's action was
unlawful and that it exposed the hospital and himself as a director to liability. As a
result, a disciplinary board eventually concluded that the physicians had not obtained
consent and had acted improperly. KATz, supra.
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research practices at the highest levels of American science.151 Both insti-
tutions promulgated guidelines governing human research in 1966. The
FDA's guidelines were based partly on the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki,
with some emphasis placed on obtaining informed consent.' 5 2 NIH's con-
tribution was to move from a system where ethical decision-making was left
to the individual conscience of the physician-investigator to a system of
compulsory collective review.153 Initially, however, the forerunner of the
institutional review board (IRB) was basically a peer review committee.' 5 4
Within the next decade, matters changed dramatically. Revelations
about the Tuskegee Syphillis study' 55 and other research scandals led to
intense congressional scrutiny, which in turn led to the creation of the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research.' 5 6 The Secretary of the Department of Health
Education and Welfare (now Health and Human Services) was to select
eleven members "from among 'the general public and from individuals in
the fields of medicine, law, ethics, theology, biological science, physical
science, social science, philosophy, humanities, health administration, gov-
ernment, and public affairs"' with no more than five of them being
researchers.' 5 7 The Secretary chose five scientists, three lawyers, two
ethicists, and one individual from public affairs.' 5 8 The National Commis-
sion identified the basic ethical principles which were to govern human
research and promulgated regulations based on those principles.' 5 9
Under a "forcing clause," the Secretary was required to accept the Commis-
sion's recommendations or publicly disclose the reasons for their rejec-
tion. 160 Many of the recommendations were accepted' 61 and became the
151. RoHm Mui, supra note 64, at 70-84, 86-93 (1991). See generally M.H. PAPPWORTH,
HumAN GuiN.A PIGs: EXPERIMENTATION ON MAN (1967) (exposing similar abuses in the
United Kingdom).
152. RoTHmAN, supra note 64, at 89, 93. Final adoption of the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki was itself influenced by the prospect of the FDA's move to standardize research
trials. Annas, supra note 148, at 25-26.
153. RoTHm .N, supra note 64, at 90.
154. Id.
155. See generally JoNEs, supra note 149. For forty years, the United States Public
Health Service had studied 400 syphilitic poor black men from rural Alabama without
informing them about the true nature of the study (to study the untreated course of
syphilis in the black male, originally intended to confront the beliefs of the medical
profession in the 1930's that the course of syphilis was different in blacks and whites)
and had even dissuaded or prevented many of the men from obtaining treatment.
Despite various reports of the study being made in the medical literature from time to
time, the study came to public scrutiny and was terminated only after a former employee
of the Public Health Service disclosed the information to an Associated Press reporter
who broke the story injuly of 1972. Id. at 188-219. As of 1965, only one physician had
objected to the study on ethical grounds. Id. at 190.
156. RomrmN, supra note 64, at 168-88.
157. Id. at 188.
158. OFFICE OF TECHNoLoGY AssEsSmENT, BIoMEDIcAL Emics nN U.S. Pusuc POLICY-
BACKGROUND PAPm 11 (1993) (Doc. No. OTA-BP-BBS-105) [hereinafter BACKGROUND
PAPER].
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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current regulations 162 governing federally sponsored human research.
The FDA regulations adopt the same ethical principles.
The FDA now accepts clinical research data from trials conducted
abroad in support of an application for drug approval, provided that the
research is conducted "in accordance with ethical principles acceptable to
the world community." 163 The FDA accepts data that conforms to the Dec-
laration of Helsinki or "the laws and regulations of the country in which
the research was conducted, whichever represents the greater protection
for the individual." 164
The EU has likewise adopted the Declaration of Helsinki as its code of
ethics for research trials. 165 Apparently, Japan only recently (in 1985)
promulgated clinical practice standards "to pay due ethical consideration
to the rights of persons who undergo clinical tests."166 However, a recent
article on the harmonization process describes Japan's introduction of
"high clinical practice standards" as lagging behind Europe and the United
States. 167 The article indicates that patients serving as research subjects
"are supposed to be adequately informed."168 The wording of this phrase
suggests that they may not always be so informed. While most industrial-
ized nations have some ethical review standards or mechanisms in place,
many developing countries, where the majority of the world's population
and hence potential research subjects live, do not.169
A. Ethical Malaise in International Research.
The current regulatory climate leaves room for the possibility that pharma-
ceutical companies and other researchers will be testing drugs on humans
in countries where protection for human subjects is nonexistent or enforce-
ment is lax. Some commentators believe that drug companies bypass
existing regulatory mechanisms to persuade individual physicians to con-
duct clinical trials on new and untested products in situations where even
the physician's institution is unaware. 170 These are cases that are difficult
to monitor or trace, and in which it is entirely unknown whether informed
consent was obtained.' 7 ' Some cases have come to light that suggest inves-
162. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.117 (1993).
163. Foreign Clinical Studies Not Conducted Under an IND, 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a)
(1993).
164. Id. at § 312.120(c). The Declaration, which is set out in subsection (c)(4) of the
regulations appears to be the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical Association
as amended through the 41st World Medical Assembly, Hong Kong, September 1989.
165. JohnJ. Gorski, An FDA-EEC Perspective on the International Acceptance of Foreign
Clinical Data, 21 CAL. W. INT' LJ. 329, 351 n.150 (1991).
166. Minori Tatsuno et al., Japan, in INTamATIoNAI PHauRAcEuTMcAL SERvicES, supra
note 3, at 303, 320.
167. Kodama, supra note 10, at 8.
168. Id.
169. TowARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ETHIC, supra note 39, at 39.
170. Ren-Zong Qiu, supra note 29, at 124. See also TowARDs AN INTERNATIONAL ETHIC,
supra note 39, at 70 (indicating that physicians in developing countries frequently use
the drugs supplied by pharmaceutical companies for testing without doing proper fol-
low-up; the physicians' reports are nonetheless used to obtain regulatory approval).
171. Ren-Zong Qiu, supra note 29, at 124.
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tigators are conducting research in developing countries because it is easier
to get approval. 172 Another incident in Africa suggests that substantial
amounts of research can be conducted without seeking local regulatory
approval. 173 Another reason why developing countries might be preferred
is the decreased exposure to liability, e.g., product liability.' 74 The current
harmonization activities can only lead to an increase in research conducted
in other countries.
Unethical research is possible even when racism, cruelty or greed are
absent as motivating factors for the scientists involved in research. Experi-
ence teaches that the "greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
ing."1 75 The tendency of scientists "to assume there is a hierarchy of ethics
with the scientific ethic at the pinnacle" and to minimize "competing social
ethics" has long been documented. 176 Under this view "the end of knowl-
edge justifies the scientific means" and science's contributions are best
achieved when it is allowed to be carried on independent of political,
social, and religious pressures. 177 Implicit in the Nuremberg trial of the
Nazi physicians is the notion that humans are "most vulnerable to misuse
when they are asked to submit to experiments in the name of science."178
The presence of doctors in white coats in a therapeutic setting among
patients may result in the misplaced notion that what is being done is for a
patient's own good.179 Residents of some developing countries are partic-
ularly susceptible because of the high degree of illiteracy and low level of
education. 180 Payments to research subjects or even the provision of medi-
cal services not otherwise available may serve as inducements for poor citi-
zens of developing countries to take risks we would find unacceptable in
172. See Peter Lurie et al, Ethical, Behavioral, and Social Aspects of HIV Vaccine Trials
in Developing Countries, 271 JAMA 295, 296 (1994). In 1990, the WHO also investi-
gated use of an AIDS treatment that was being tested for efficacy in Romania on HIV
positive orphan babies and adults without prior in-depth animal or laboratory studies or
studies of toxicity and safety conducted on healthy humans-something which was not
possible "in the West." Steven Dickman & Peter Aldhous, WHO Concern Over New
Drug, 347 Sci. 606, 606 (1990). The drug's previous testing in the East African state of
Malawi resulted in conflicting reports about the scientific validity of its alleged positive
effects. Id. Shortly after the WHO investigation, the drug trials were banned by
Romanian officials despite their earlier claims that their own regulatory agency had
found the drug safe and efficacious. Romania Halts AIDS Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1990, at C9.
173. See Zimbabwe Accuses Doctor of Nazi-like Experiments, Toaowro STAR, Mar. 5,
1993, at A3 (describing an official investigation of a British anesthetist who had experi-
mented on 500 patients, without their knowledge and official approval, to determine the
sensitivity of women under anesthesia to morphine).
174. Lurie et al., supra note 172.
175. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
176. KATz Er AL., supra note 150, at 105 (quoting Ted R. Vaughan, Governmental Inter-
vention in Social Research-Political and Ethical Dimensions in the Wichita Jury Recordings,
in Emaics, PoLmcs AmD SocLAL RFsAscH 50, 60-75 (Gideon Sjoberg ed., 1967)).
177. Id. at 104-05.
178. Mariner, supra note 9, at 295.
179. KArz ET AL, supra note 150, at 55, 60.
180. Ren-Zong Qiu, supra note 29, at 115.
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developed countries 8 1
B. The Limited Remedy of Existing Research Controls and Side Effects
of Harmonization
In the United States, the primary enforcement mechanism is the FDA's abil-
ity to refuse to consider domestic or foreign data which fails to meet the
applicable guidelines. In addition, with respect to domestic data, the FDA
has a number of administrative actions which it may take in response to an
IRB or its governing institution's failure to comply with the regulations pro-
tecting human subjects. These include termination of ongoing studies,
withholding of approval for new studies, and disqualification. 18 2 These
administrative actions require on-site inspections by the FDA, which are
difficult to achieve abroad.' 8 3
Under U.S. law, harmful conduct by one human being upon another is
usually governed by the states through criminal laws.' 8 4 However, very
few states have laws governing research, largely because of the existence of
federal regulations. 1 85 In fact, a great deal of research is federally regu-
lated because of its federal funding or because it requires FDA approval. 18 6
How much research is conducted outside this scheme of federal regulation
is unknown, but absent state laws, it is entirely unregulated.' 8 7 The limits
181. For example, organ trafficking in Uruguay and Argentina is widespread; one
individual who had advertised a kidney for sale indicated that he had been out of work
for a year and a half and that he considered the personal sacrifice necessary for the
future of his children. See Maria L. Avignolo, Children Robbed of Their Kidneys in Argen-
tina, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Dec. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File. A similar situation has been widely reported to exist in Egypt. See Chris Hedges,
Egyptian Doctors Limit Kidney Transplants, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1992, at A5.
182. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.120-56.124 (1993).
183. See Philip B. White, International Memoranda of Understanding, 49 FOOD &
DRUG LJ. 171, 171 (1994) (describing how Memoranda of Understanding can reduce
the costs and burdens of onsite inspections for FDA oversight of "good manufacturing
practices"); Joseph G. Contrera, Comment, The Food and Drug Administration and the
International Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious Will Pharmaceutical Regu-
lations Become?, 8 ADMIN. LJ. Am. U. 927, 948-49 (1995) (suggesting that a Memoranda
of Understanding procedure to allow foreign inspectors to inspect for good clinical prac-
tices would avoid the "costly and time-consuming" requirement of verification of compli-
ance by the FDA). The FDA continues to experience difficulties with verification of
studies conducted abroad because of inadequate or incomplete records and fraudulent
or concealed information. Keith C. Epstein & Bill Sloat, Foreign Tests Don't Meet U.S.
Criteria, PtLAiN DELER, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1A, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews
File. See also Gorski, supra note 165, at 342 (indicating that foreign laws which deny
access to medical records can also present problems for the FDA).
184. George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Where Do We Go from Here?, in NAzi
DocroRs, supra note 9, at 307, 312.
185. Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes and
Regulations, in Nazi DocroRs, supra note 9, at 183, 194.
186. Id. at 187. In addition, institutions which receive federal funds are required to
ensure that research which is not federally funded also be "reviewed for ethical propri-
ety;" most institutions apply the federal guidelines to all research rather than administer
separate systems of review. BARRY R. FURRow Er AL., BIoETHics: HEALTH CARE LAW AND
ETmics 387. The regulations for FDA approval and federally funded research are essen-
tially the same. Id.
187. Glantz, supra note 185, at 194.
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of federal regulation became abundantly clear in 1977 when a pharmaceu-
tical company obtained approval from the Nevada legislature to sell the
controversial "anti-aging" drug Gerovital in Nevada even though the drug
had not been approved by the FDA. 188 The FDA admitted it was "power-
less" to act if the company could keep all phases of the drug process (man-
ufacture, distribution, and consumption) within the state's borders.189
There have been isolated reports of questionable research conducted
outside the scope of government review,190 and while some allege that the
current magnitude of the problem is small,191 there is simply no way to
know. 192 Similarly, there seem to be no enforceable regulations prohibit-
ing unethical research conducted abroad so long as the drug's sponsor
does not need to rely on that data for FDA approval.
There are no international treaties governing experimentation on
humans. 193 As a result, the international documents dealing with research
trials have little legal effect. 194 The most widely known international codes
of ethics for the protection of human subjects are the Nuremberg Code and
the Declaration of Helsinki. Both, however, have shortcomings. They
direct themselves solely to the "integrity and judgment" of the investigator,
although the Declaration of Helsinki, beginning in 1975, added ethical
188. Larry Kramer, Gambling with the FDA in Nevada: State Approves Drug that Claims
to Help the Elderly, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1977, at F1.
189. Id. The FDA would be able to require the pharmaceutical company to register as
a manufacturer and would be able to examine the manufacturing plant to investigate for
quality control if interstate commerce was present. Id. In the United States, the author-
ity for federal pharmaceutical regulation is and has been based on the Constitution's
authorization for congressional control of interstate commerce. NHIsN'q, supra note 59,
at 4.
190. One extraordinary incident recently came to light five years after the unauthor-
ized experiments were conducted. See Philip J. Hilts, Researchers Admit Study with Drugs
Had No O.X, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1993, at B5. In 1987, two neurosurgeons, former
N.I.H. researchers, injected terminal, brain tumor patients with a drug that had been
approved by the FDA for a kidney cancer study conducted at the same institution by two
other researchers. They were never prosecuted for any wrongdoing and the U.S. Attor-
ney's office in Manhattan refused to reveal their names. Meanwhile, the surgeon who
had diverted the surplus drugs to this unauthorized research was investigated by the U.S.
Attorney; his name was forwarded for disciplinary action, although no charges were
brought because "no apparent harm" was done to the dying patients. Id. The two
neurosurgeons who actually conducted the study had sought FDA approval; after receiv-
ing an initial rejection from FDA (due to insufficient information on their application)
and impatient to treat their waiting patients, the pair convinced the prominent cancer
specialist to give them the drug to conduct their unauthorized study. The scientists then
engaged in a five year cover-up of their activities. Id.
191. Marcia Angell, Barbarism in the Name of Science: Data from Unethical Experi-
ments Should Be Barred, WASH. Posr, July 10, 1990, at 6.
192. A recent expos6 of British pharmaceutical research suggests that fraud and mis-
conduct by academic researchers, drug companies, and especially general practitioners
hired to conduct clinical trials for post-marketing surveillance, is on the increase. Rosie
Waterhouse, Exposure of Fraud in GP Drug Tests 'On the Rise,' IN-DEPrnEr, Jan. 25,
1993, at 3.
193. Erwin Deutsch, Medical Experimentation: International Rules and Practice, 19
VICTORuA U. WEI-NGTON L. REv. 1, 4 (1989).
194. Id. at 4.
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review for "consideration, comment and guidance" by committee. 19 Both
fail to provide an enforcement mechanism, or any sanctions, and have been
criticized as too ambiguous, representing nothing more than "pious hopes"
that physicians will behave ethically.196 As the legislative findings of Cali-
fornia's laws governing non-federally regulated research recognized, in the
international context, "[n]either the Nuremberg Code nor the Declaration
of Helsinki are codified under law and are, therefore, unenforceable." 197
Both the code and declaration have also been criticized as too tied to West-
ern principles which are not necessarily applicable to other cultures.198
The latter concern was addressed in the Proposed Guidelines pro-
duced by a 1978 collaboration by the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the Council of International Organizations of Medical Science
(CIOMS) to assist developing countries to ensure that principles of medical
ethics are observed in biomedical research. 199 The WHO/CIOMS Guide-
lines provide a more flexible approach to the problem of informed consent.
While "the involvement of human subjects in biomedical research must be
contingent whenever feasible, upon freely-elicited informed consent and
upon liberty to withhold or withdraw collaboration at any stage without
fear or prejudice," the Guidelines recognize that the goal may be unobtain-
able, and yet research may still be morally justified. 200 The focus of the
Guidelines then becomes protecting the welfare of subjects in light of this
limitation. Among the dilemmas addressed by the Guidelines are commu-
nity-based research, such as water fluoridation (where individual informed
consent is not obtainable) and research conducted in communally-oriented
societies. 201 In the latter case, the Guidelines provide for consent through
a trusted intermediary or community leader with the proviso that the com-
munity leader make clear to the subject that the subject's participation is
not required and may be withheld or withdrawn at any time.202 Placing
too much emphasis on "informed consent" as the primary means of pro-
tecting research subjects can lead to insufficient protection.203 Accord-
ingly, the Guidelines emphasize the need for mandatory prospective ethical
review of research protocols. 20 4 It is unclear to what extent the CIOMS
Guidelines have been implemented, although there is some evidence to sug-
gest they are in use.20 5 On the international level, laws governing medical
195. Sharon Perley et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in NAz
DocroRs, supra note 9, at 149, 160. IRB's under the FDA regulations have authority to
disapprove research proposals. 21 C.F.R. § 56.109(a) (1993).
196. Perley et al., supra note 195, at 160.
197. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24171(b) (West Supp. 1997).
198. Perley et al., supra note 195, at 162.
199. Id. at 161. The Guidelines are based on the Declaration of Helsinki. Id. at 162.
200. Id. at 162-63.
201. Id. at 163.
202. Id.
203. Id. Subjects in developing countries "may not be sufficiently aware of the impli-
cations of participating in an experiment to give adequately informed consent." Id. at
162.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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practice and harmful conduct by one human being upon another are usu-
ally the province of individual nations, yet the codes of conduct governing
human experimentation are largely international. 20 6
Considering the limited protection for human subjects in many areas,
one possibility would be to prohibit research altogether unless the investi-
gators can proceed under a recognized ethical code. However, this view
fails to recognize that research does not always involve an experiment con-
ducted to the detriment of the subject. Research brings with it many bene-
fits. First, clinical drug trials may present the only available treatment for a
particular disease.20 7 Second, free medical treatment, increased monitor-
ing, and the attention of specialists often accompany research. Third, as
previously noted,208 drugs do not have the same effect for all populations.
If a drug is never tested in one country, scientists may fail to discover that it
would have an effect on its population, and may dismiss it as ineffective.20 9
A critical example where this may be the case is in the testing of AIDS
drugs, particularly the vaccines that are about to enter the final stages of
drug trials: the strains of AIDS prevalent in developing countries are differ-
ent from those in the U.S. and Europe.210 Finally, a drug that is regarded
as safe and effective in a developed country cannot be presumed to be
equally beneficent in a developing country that "lacks ancillary medical,
nutritional, and distributional services." 211 Thus, failing to test a drug
prior to marketing represents merely a shift to post-marketing experimen-
tation and raises human rights issues of its own.2 1 2 It is not satisfactory to
say that research cannot be conducted where the human rights of potential
subjects cannot be assured.
The harmonization resulting from the ICH process also provides inad-
equate protection for human subjects. In August of 1995, the FDA pub-
lished draft guidelines agreed to by the ICH participants which are
intended to govern the conduct of research involving humans.213 The draft
Guideline on Good Clinical Practice is worded broadly enough to allow the
FDA to continue to demand the same protection for human subjects
required under existing regulations.214 If the harmonization process
amounts to nothing more than an agreement on basic requirements, then
human subjects are placed at no greater risk through the adoption of these
guidelines. If on the other hand, the harmonization process results in a
mutual recognition procedure, the FDA may not be able to enforce the
same high standards of protection for human subjects. The FDA's only
206. Annas & Grodin, supra note 184, at 313.
207. See Lurie et al., supra note 172.
208. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. Ellen N. Cone, Note, International Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: The Role of the
World Health Organization, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 331, 340 (1983).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 120-126.
213. International Conference on Harmonisation: Draft Guideline on Good Clinical
Practice, 60 Fed. Reg. 42948 (1995).
214. 45 C.F.t. §§ 46.101-46.117 (1993).
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weapon continues to be the ability to deny marketing approval for a phar-
maceutical product. To exercise this weapon, the FDA will need to detect
noncompliance with its requirements, and also to deny marketing approval
under the mutual recognition agreement. To detect noncompliance, the
FDA must monitor the requirements or be assured that another ICH par-
ticipant is effectively monitoring the research.215 It is not clear that FDA
oversight is possible or economically feasible.216 In addition to oversight,
the FDA must have the right to deny marketing approval "for cause" where
noncompliance is detected and the investigators fail to protect the rights of
the human subjects in their research trials. The FDA has previously
insisted on abidance by high ethical standards before accepting foreign
data. It should continue to do so.
As presently worded, the Guideline on Good Clinical Practice "should
be followed when generating clinical data that are intended to be submitted
to regulatory authorities" in the ICH participant countries. 217 However, as
far as the FDA is concerned, this interpretive rule is not binding on anyone,
including the FDA.2 18 It is not clear whether the guidelines, if finally
agreed upon, will be made enforceable or mandatory for other ICH partici-
pating nations. However, no mechanism exists for any ICH participant (or
third party) to enforce any aspect of harmonization on any other ICH par-
ticipant which does not comply with or enforce an agreement. 219 Thus
these guidelines present the same shortcoming in enforceability as the
Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki.
C. Prophylactic and Antiseptic Remedies-Prescription for Healthy
Biomedical Research
A document of a binding character to which all the nations of the world
may subscribe, such as a convention, is needed.220 There are compelling
reasons to promote the United Nations as the body to promulgate such a
convention, including credibility.221 Such a convention would require an
enforcement mechanism to have any meaning. Enforcement might be
215. Contrera, supra note 183, at 948-49.
216. Id. at 952-53 (citing budgetary constraints limiting FDA's international
activities).
217. Id.
218. Id. (indicating that the guideline "does not create or confer any rights, privileges,
or benefits for or on any person, nor does it operate to bind the FDA in any way").
219. Contrera, supra note 183, at 954-55.
220. See, e.g., Bassiouni et al., supra note 36 (providing a draft of such a convention).
221. Annas & Grodin, supra note 184, at 312. CIOMS credibility has apparently been
affected by its creation of "broad exceptions" to informed consent requirements and the
World Medical Assembly's credibility has been affected by its failure to take a stance
regarding Apartheid. Id. The World Medical Assembly's moral authority was also
recently called into question by its election of a physician with a Nazi-SS past to the
presidency. See Michael Franzblau, Investigate Nazi Ties of German Doctor, SAN FaNt'.
CISCO CHRON., Dec. 29, 1993, at A17 (he resigned as president when the AMA produced
documents he had signed authorizing a patient's transfer to a center known for its eutha-
nasia experiments).
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through an international court such as a "permanent Nuremberg"222 or a
World Human Rights Court. Enforcement could also be achieved through
the adoption of national laws (or uniform state laws) governing all
research, and not just research which obtains government funding or
requires government approval, that is conducted in that nation or by its
nationals.223
1. For Immediate Relief-Adopting Minimum Standards
The European Union is presently working on a "Bioethics Convention"
which would concern, inter alia, research in Europe.224 The obstacles
encountered by that process 225 would likely be repeated in an interna-
tional effort to draft a bioethics convention. One possibility for minimizing
delays would be to focus the convention narrowly on basic research princi-
ples and allow for later supplementation of principles governing more con-
troversial areas of research, such as research on children, embryos, and
fetuses. Except for a few controversial areas, there is a fairly wide "trans-
cultural acceptance" of standards governing ethical research, although
many cultural and national differences arise with respect to procedures for
their implementation.226 Another way to make the process of drafting
such a convention feasible without producing a meaningless document is
to concentrate on defining minimum universally acceptable standards.227
As one delegate to the 1987 International Summit Conference on Bioethics
pointed out, "[it is] odd that we have minimum standards for the experi-
mental use of animals without something equivalent for the experimental
use of human beings."228
Individual nations would then be free to tailor the enforcement mecha-
nisms to the local culture and practice229 or to adopt additional or more
rigorous requirements. One of the approaches which has worked well for
several nations in developing guidelines for a number of bioethics areas is
illustrated by the work of the U.S. National Commission. 230 The U.S.
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) recently identified factors which
appear to make government initiated biomedical ethics bodies (such as
commissions, committees or ethics boards) successful. The OTA studied
such bodies in the federal, state, and international arena. Predictors of
success include "adequate staffing and funding," as well as commissions
which were "relatively free of political interference, had flexibility in
222. Robert Drinan, The Nuremberg Principles in International Law, in NAZ DocroRs,
supra note 9, at 174, 176.
223. See Annas & Grodin, supra note 184, at 312.
224. See Arthur Rogers, Europe: Ethical Diversity: European Community Fails to Estab-
lish Bioethics Policy, 339 L.car 861 (1992).
225. Id.
226. TowARDs AN INTERATIONAL ETmc, supra note 39, at 51.
227. Id. at 53.
228. Id. at 70 (statement of Professor Gordon Dunstan).
229. See id. at 41 (describing committee review practices among some of the ICH
nations).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 155-162.
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addressing issues, were open in their process and dissemination of find-
ings and were comprised of a diverse group of individuals who were gener-
ally free of ideology and had wide ranging expertise." 231 All of these
factors may not apply to every country; however, when creating any work-
ing body to confront the tougher concerns raised by pharmaceutical regu-
lation, such predictors should be given serious consideration, particularly
those which consider the community's point of view. Given the vast
amount of literature and scholarship available in this area, each nation's
commission would not have to reinvent the wheel, but merely consider
how to apply universal principles to local conditions, determine which pro-
cedural mechanisms will work most effectively, and establish any neces-
sary additional protections for its population.
The more public the commission process is, the more it should help
with the goals of the next important step in developing adequate protection
for the rights of human subjects of research. In order to have an effective
system of protection, there must be a high level of awareness of the ethical
problems posed by pharmaceutical research on the part of scientists and
those who will represent the interests of the public and the culture where
the research is being conducted. Developing countries seem to be at a dis-
advantage in our increasingly smaller world and international cooperation
needs to be strengthened to prevent developing countries from becoming
exploited.3 2 There is a need to train bioethicists from developing coun-
tries to teach, to do research, and to serve on IRB's.3 3 Moreover, if scien-
tists do not internalize the ethical norms, there will be no enforcement.
First, as with any law, self-enforcement is the most effective mechanism.
Second, often the only way unethical conduct is discovered is through
whistle-blowers, i.e., persons within the scientific community who have
inside knowledge of the facts and who feel a moral obligation to step for-
ward. Among notable disclosures of potential ethics problems which
would not have come to light were it not for an insider are the Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital cancer study,234 the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,235
and the recent disclosures by U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary about
government radiation testing.3 6 Thus, an effective system would need to
231. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 158, at 18.
232. See Ren-Zong QuL, supra note 29, at 124.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
235. See generally JoNs, supra note 149.
236. See Keith Schneider, Secret Nuclear Research on People Comes to Light, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 17, 1993, at Al. After decades of government secrecy, Energy Department Secre-
tary Hazel R. O'Leary disclosed in December of 1993 that numerous experiments expos-
ing civilians to high levels of radiation were conducted for three decades after World War
II. Id. Some of these experiments were conducted without obtaining the consent of the
subjects. Although the disclosure was prompted by a newspaper's Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request for more information regarding one research project conducted at
Argonne National Laboratory, neither verification about that project nor the scope of
radiation research activity on civilians would have come to light but for the Energy Sec-
retary's decision to disclose and order a full scale investigation. See id. The disclosures
generated disagreement about the ethical standards applicable at the time the experi-
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(1) train philosophers, theologians, scholars, and others to represent the
community and consumer interests; (2) train scientists to recognize ethical
dilemmas and apply the appropriate principles; 23 7 and (3) encourage and
protect whistle-blowers.
Recognizing the important function served by whistle-blowers in
reporting scientific misconduct, the United States recently promoted gov-
ernment protection of whistle-blowers from retaliation by their employ-
ers.2 38 Whether a system encouraging whistle-blowers should be
promoted depends on the presence of some amount of public accountabil-
ity by the government. Otherwise, a system encouraging whistle-blowers
may be dangerous to the scientific community.' 3 9 In this regard, wide-
spread news coverage has been instrumental in the development of various
governments' responses and protection for research subjects and the
citizenry.240
Once these factors are in place, each nation will be able to provide its
citizens at least a basic level of protection when they are involved in
research. Over time and with continued international effort, the protection
available to human subjects should increase. Some developing countries
will be able to offer their citizens protection equivalent to that offered by
developed countries. This is a necessary, but not a sufficient step, because
some developing countries may be unable or unwilling to protect the
human rights of all those found within their borders. Every developed
country must also apply the international code to all research (1) funded
by that country's government, (2) subject to government approval, (3) con-
ducted in that country, or (4) conducted by its nationals abroad. Devel-
oped countries must censure research which fails to meet these minimum
standards. 24 1 This will cover the existing gaps in the regulations governing
ments were conducted. See, e.g., Linda Feldman, Ethicists Look at Radiation Tests, CHmis-
muN Sci. MoNroT, Dec. 31, 1993, at 2.
237. See Townms AN INTERNAToINAL Emc, supra note 39, at 54. The appropriate
principles should include seeking ethical review. See infra text accompanying notes 266-
277.
238. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat.
122, 142 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 289b) (1993).
239. In Argentina, for instance, it is widely speculated that the 1985 disappearance of
a hematologist employed at the Montes de Oca psychiatric clinic outside of Buenos Aires
was part of an effort to cover up the investigation into the human organ trafficking being
conducted at that facility. See Horror Story at Argentine Mental Hospital, AGENCE FRANCE
PRosE, Mar. 10, 1992; Avignolo, supra note 181.
240. See Deutsch, supra note 193, at 4-8.
241. One possibility would be to not only prohibit the use of unethical research as
support for an application for new drug approval, as the FDA does, but to penalize any
application tainted by such research. Thus, where a company cannot demonstrate that
studies conducted in a developing country meet the minimum ethical requirements, reg-
ulatory approval may be denied even though the application is supported by sufficient
ethically conducted research. An alternative penalty would be to grant regulatory
approval but provide for an alternative sanction, such as decreasing the time allowed on
patent protection. Such a position would comport with the view that we must never
profit from unethically gathered data. See Marcia Angell, Editorial Responsibility: Pro-
tecting Human Rights by Restricting Publication of Unethical Research, in NAzi DocTORs,
supra note 9, at 281-82; Jay Katz, We Must Never Benefit from Evil in "Science," NEwsDAY,
279
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human conduct. Developed countries can also promote higher standards
of ethical conduct by requiring government sponsored research conducted
abroad, including pharmaceutical research for which regulatory approval is
sought, to meet whichever guidelines provide the most protection for sub-
jects, that of the sponsoring government or that of the government where
the research is conducted. 242 We are not at the point yet of "harmonizing"
regulations protecting human subjects on a global basis. This necessarily
requires some duplication of ethical review. However, nations should
strive to reduce the amount of duplicative review required, otherwise this
may also make development of pharmaceuticals, especially those targeted
at the needs of the developing world, prohibitively expensive.
2. Informed Consent: Malady or Treatment?
In terms of the specific procedures or principles to regulate research on
humans, there are a couple of areas which particularly need to be
addressed by developing countries in both the global dialogue for estab-
lishing international standards and in the national process of regulation-
setting. The most controversial of these areas concerns the necessity of
obtaining the informed consent of all subjects. Recently, some commenta-
tors have suggested that exporting the doctrine of informed consent to
developing countries which have a communitarian outlook and lack a con-
cept of "self' or "personhood" amounts to "ethical imperialism" or an
imposition of Western values on non-Western cultures. 243 In such a soci-
ety, it may sometimes be appropriate to accept the community standard of
consent-to seek consent on behalf of the individual from the head of the
household or the community leader.244 This is the approach adopted by
the CIOMS Guidelines. 245 Moreover, seeking individual informed consent
may not only be fruitless, it may undermine the nonindividualistic soci-
ety's fabric.246 Failure to accept the community standard also violates the
principle of autonomy in that it fails to respect the integrity of the
community.247
The West may place too much weight on the principle of autonomy,
and thus correspondingly on the protection afforded by informed consent.
Whether patient autonomy includes the right to demand a specific type of
July 11, 1988, at 50; Isabel Wilkerson, Nazi Scientists and Ethics Today, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 1989, at 1-34.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 163-164 (describing such a requirement by
the FDA). The CIOMS Guidelines provide that the ethical standards should be "no less
exacting" than if the research were performed in the sponsoring country. Nicholas A.
Christakis, The Ethical Design of an AIDS Vaccine Trial in Africa, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
June-July, 1988, at 31.
243. Christakis, supra note 242, at 34-35; Ross Kessel, Commentary: Informed Con-
sent in the Developing World, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1984, at 23; Lisa H. Newton,
Ethical Imperialism and Informed Consent, IRB: A REviEw OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH,
May-June 1990, at 10.
244. Newton, supra note 243.
245. See supra text accompanying note 202.
246. Newton, supra note 243, at 11.
247. Id. at 10-11.
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treatment (e.g., life-sustaining treatment without possibility of "medical
benefit") is an issue that continues to be debated.248 A similar instance
occurs when some advocates of radical pharmaceutical reform demand
that the FDA abandon its regulation of research and that drugs which have
not been proven to be safe and effective be tested under a system where
patient and physician make an "informed choice." 249 It is true that, simply
because ethical rules based on our common western "traditions and heri-
tage" work for us, does not necessarily mean they can be exported to the
rest of the world.250 "The underlying philosophy and heritage of Western
Europe's civilization is intricately woven with the recognition of the ina-
lienable and absolute rights of the individual."251
In the West, there may be too much emphasis on the formalities of
"obtaining signatures on elaborate consent forms [which] can become a
mechanical substitute for dialogue," 252 that fails to convey to the potential
subject information which is truly relevant to the subject's decision to par-
ticipate in research.253 Although there are at least seven requirements
which must be met prior to research approval, review of research in the
United States focuses largely on (1) whether "[r]isks to subjects are reason-
able in relation to anticipated benefits"254 and (2) whether the procedures
for obtaining informed consent are adequate.255 However, these are not
reasons to abolish informed consent, but rather to redefine it.
As the Nazi war-time experiments demonstrated, meaningful, autono-
mous, informed consent is also necessary to serve as a check on society's
use of the individual for its own ends. That is why abandoning informed
consent in communitarian societies, which might favor the interests of
society over those of the individual, 256 seems particularly troublesome. 257
248. See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physicians's
Professional Conscience, 44 HASINGS LJ. 1241 (1993) (discussing a case honoring a fam-
ily's request that an 87-year-old woman in an irreversible coma be kept on life support
despite her physicians' belief that the treatment was futile); Ellen Goodman, Do-It-Your-
self Medicine No Cure for the System, NEWSDAY, OCt. 28, 1993, at 123 (commenting on a
case where an anencephalic infant's mother succeeded in keeping the brain-absent child
on full life support).
249. See, e.g., Beth E. Myers, The Food and Drug Administration's Experimental Drug
Approval System: Is it Good for Your Health?, 28 Hous. L. REv. 309, 334-36; Wells, supra
note 2, at 411. For the reasons why such a system would not be in society's or the
individual's best interests, see text accompanying supra notes 94-104.
250. Brian Walsh, Protecting Citizens from Their Own Countries: How the European
Court of Human Rights Affects Domestic Laws and Personal Liberties, 15 HuM. RTs. 20, 22
(1988).
251. Id.
252. Harvey Teff, Medical Models and Legal Categories: An English Perspective, 9J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 211, 218 (1993).
253. See Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. LJ. 7,
34-38 (1993).
254. 45 C.F.Rt § 46.111 (1993).
255. BARRY R. FuRRoW ET AL., BioemIcs: HEALTH CAPE LAW AND ETHics 387 (1991).
256. Christakis, supra note 242, at 35.
257. Abandonment of the informed consent requirement may lead to exploitation of
communitarian societies by pharmaceutical researchers who may be tempted to perform
research in these societies then try to use the results in developed countries or use them
Cornell International Law Journal
Moreover, informed consent is needed in clinical trials, even though
patients and investigators believe they have the patient's interest "upper-
most in mind," because investigators may in fact have other personal and
professional interests. 25 8 Informed consent serves as a check on these con-
flicting interests. 2 59 Informed consent involves two significant elements of
ethical research. First, informed consent is substantive; it is one way to
demonstrate respect for the individual's autonomy. Second, informed con-
sent is a procedural device for the protection of the subject, which more
often than not, tends to promote the interests of the subject. Even if we
accept the view that informed consent is not the appropriate way to demon-
strate respect for autonomy in a communitarian society, or can be overrid-
den by the principle of nonmaleficence, we still need to be sure that
sufficient procedural protections are in place.
Consent by head of the household or community leader may not pro-
vide sufficient procedural protection. First, there is the difficulty of
researchers from outside the culture identifying the appropriate substitute
decision-maker. 260 Second, relying on communitarian philosophy in the
absence of informed consent/autonomy is problematic because individual
research subjects may be exploited by a politician or community leader
pretending to be carrying out the best interests of the whole society.26 1
Finally, as demonstrated by the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, obtaining consent
from more educated members of the same racial and ethnic group does not
adequately protect the subjects from exploitation. 262 Consent by commu-
nity leaders may be a necessary, but not a sufficient step to protect the
rights of research subjects.
There are also reasons to question whether informed consent should
be abandoned as a substantive element of autonomy. First, consent by the
leader on behalf of the community requires a generalization that all mem-
bers of the community subscribe to the communitarian outlook and have
no concept of self. Moreover, some commentators have indicated that indi-
vidual, informed consent is necessary because developing societies are
becoming more urbanized, and the anthropological data on which the
communitarian consent arguments are based are outdated.263 Thus, the
CIOMS Guidelines allowing substitute consent seem, at best, problematic,
and at worst, inadequate.
as an inexpensive way to conduct .preliminary studies before proceeding with more rig-
orous research. See supra notes 159-62, 221 and accompanying text; infra notes 257-64
and accompanying text.
258. Katz, supra note 253, at 17.
259. Id. In fact, Katz suggests this is the only way to keep these non-therapeutic inter-
ests in check. Id
260. Christakis, supra note 242, at 34.
261. Ren-Zong Qiu, supra note 29, at 121.
262. See Jones, supra note 149, at 196-200 (indicating that consent for the study had
been obtained in 1969 from the mostly black Macon County Medical Society).
263. Carel B. Ijsselmuiden, Research and Informed Consent in Africa: Another Look,
326 Naw ENG. J. MEr. 830, 831 (1992).
Vol. 30
1997 Harmonization in Pharmaceutical Regulation
Another issue relating to autonomy and informed consent with which
developing countries need to grapple is conveying the proper information
and documenting informed consent when illiteracy, lack of education, or
different conceptions of illness causation are prevalent.264 Finally, investi-
gators must be sure that neither the payment of fees to the subjects nor the
provision of health care or other goods and services ancillary to the
research become coercive.2 65
3. Getting a Second Opinion-The Need for Independent Oversight
It is difficult to legislate proper ethical conduct for all research protocols.
The most workable approach to protect research subjects has been the use
of independent/institutional review boards (IRB) or ethical committees. 266
IRB's primarily serve two functions. First, a peer review committee ensures
that research protocols are "scientifically sound, well-planned and safe for
human experimentation,"267 and that the potential risks to the subjects are
outweighed by potential benefits. 2 68 To carry out this function, the IRB
must have sufficient scientific expertise to evaluate the research protocol
and the competence of the researcher. Second, the IRB acts as the repre-
sentative of the "broader local community in assessing community accept-
ance of the particular risk/benefit ratio."26 9 Scientists cannot serve in this
capacity because they are not "the appropriate person[s] to ask" to make a
community assessment, just as a rabbi friend is not the appropriate person
to ask to pick out an Easter ham.270 The function of lay members of the
IRB has also been described as watch-dogs, "to guard against a closed shop
of the scientists."271 To carry out this function, IRB's need to be "as open
and representative of informed public interests as possible"27 2 and "must
relate intimately with the norms of the local population."273 There has
also been some discussion of the need to have a sufficient number of lay
members so that they are not dominated by the scientists. 274 Denmark
now requires a majority of lay members on each IRB.2 75 All countries
264. Lurie et al, supra note 172, at 297-98.
265. See 0.0. Ajayi, Taboos and Clinical Research in Africa, 6 J. Ma. ETHics 61, 62
(1980).
266. See ToWARDs AN INTERATIONAL ETHic, supra note 39, at 41-43.
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the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U. LJ. 63, 105
(1993).
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270. Id. at 106 (quoting Robert M. Veatch, The National Commission on IRB's: An
Evolutionary Approach, 9 HASnNGS CENER REp. 22, 26 (Feb. 1979)).
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272. David Taylor, Prescribing in Europe-Forces for Change, 304 Bprr. MED.J. 239,242
(1992).
273. Ajayi, supra note 265, at 63.
274. Goldner, supra note 268, at 106.
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of determining "whether the study is scientifically valid" and therefore should not be
allowed to block experimentation. See Deutsch, supra note 184. But the author also
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should consider some type of local review process which can perform both
peer review and community review. While a majority of lay IRB members
may not be necessary, lay members should constitute a significant pres-
ence on the review committee.
In addition to their active functions, the existence of an IRB and the
need for an investigator to appear before a review committee inspires the
investigator's own "self-conscious and serious sense of reflection" which
includes considering the points of view of the research subjects. 2 76 Being
forced to confront competing viewpoints "may force a reconsideration" of
the research means or sometimes alter research objectives as part of a sci-
entist's recognition of ethical responsibility.277
Finally, another bioethics principle which is of importance to develop-
ing countries is the justice principle. The justice principle requires a sense
of "fairness" in the distribution of the burdens and benefits of research. 278
When a community is called upon to serve as research subjects, the bene-
fits ought to accrue to that community.279 Moreover, the justice principle
directs that subjects should be selected "for reasons related to the problem
being studied" and not because of "their easy availability, their compro-
mised position, or their manipulability."280 This is a principle which
ought to be embodied in an international code of research ethics. It has
been recognized in other contexts. For example, the preamble of the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, 28' signed by 167 countries,28 2 promotes the
"fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of
genetic resources, including.. . by appropriate funding."28 3 Further, Arti-
cle 15 authorizes the signatories to take all necessary steps "to ensure that
the benefits of research utilizing genetic resources are shared fairly with
the nation of origin."28 4 The justice principle would also require nations
to consider whether research interests are fairly distributed or weighted
against developing countries. 285
Conclusion
Although the World Health Organization and a few countries are partici-
indicates that the trend is towards "community review" and hence toward greater lay
participation. Id.
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1997 Harmonization in Pharmaceutical Regulation
pating in the International Harmonization activities as observers,286
greater attention by the other nations of the world is needed. Harmoniza-
tion activities among the producer nations vill have a significant impact on
health care delivery for all nations. 28 7 While reducing unnecessary and
duplicative procedures should lead to reduced costs and hence better
health care for all, other outcomes can have potentially negative effects.
An increase in the acceptance of foreign data may lead to an increase
in clinical research activities in countries which lack or are unable to
enforce ethical regulations. The adoption by the producer countries of
either a mutual recognition procedure or a centralized procedure that
approves drugs at an earlier point in the research process will have to focus
more resources on post-marketing investigation and regulation. For coun-
tries which rely on a certification scheme and those whose health care
resources are already strained, such surveillance may be impossible. In
addition, the recognition that genetic or local differences can have a signifi-
cant effect on drug interactions suggests that testing which is not sensitive
to these factors increases the chance that adverse effects may be missed or
that drugs which would be efficacious for a different population have no
apparent effect on the test population.288
Where should the balance between safe drugs and speedier access be
struck? Some see the U.S. regulatory process in an international context as
excessively procedural. 28 9 At present, each country makes a different value
judgment about important life-sustaining drugs and acceptable risk levels
based upon its culture.290 Sometimes local conditions may have a legiti-
mate effect on differences in individual countries' pharmaceutical
needs,291 and thus local regulatory approval may be justified in some
cases. On the other hand, a harmonized regulatory process may benefit
consumers by providing speedier access to effective therapies. Consider-
ing the global effect of regulatory activity by producer nations, the interna-
tional harmonization process needs to shift to a global outlook, and greater
attention needs to be paid to the harmonization process by all countries.
Given the substantial, paradigmatic shift required by a harmonized policy,
there should also be broader participation by representatives from the pub-
lic and science.
Although developing countries may feel unable to participate in the
harmonization process on an equal footing with developed countries, it is
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vitally important that they do so. Developing nations may have limited
resources and human power, but they represent more than three-quarters
of potential pharmaceutical consumers. Latin America and the Caribbean
are especially expected to present growing markets. 292 While uniting such
a diverse group of nations may be difficult, regionalization may provide the
key to the ability of developing nations to have a voice in global matters
such as the pharmaceutical harmonization processes that affect their
citizens.
Globalization does not require that all countries accept the judgment
of another country that a drug is safe and efficacious. Because no drug can
be completely safe and completely efficacious at the same time, a decision
to approve a drug for marketing in a particular country involves achieving
the proper balance between safety and effectiveness. Determining the
acceptable level of adverse effects in light of the evidence of efficacy
depends on various local factors, including the prescribing patterns in the
country, self-medication practices, the availability of health care workers to
monitor patient drug use, and an understanding of the health needs of the
population. It also depends on ascertaining or investigating whether the
drug's safety or efficacy is affected by local factors such as diet or genetics.
Nonetheless, countries must recognize that human rights may be adversely
affected both by approval of an unsafe or ineffective drug and by unneces-
sary regulatory delays or obstructions to drug availability.293
Globalization does require that we recognize the interconnectedness
of world health and research on health, particularly in the area of
pharmaceuticals. As with environmental pollution, diseases know no
boundaries. Global health care must become a priority for all nations
because we are all affected by the health care problems of the most trou-
bled nations. If research is to be conducted in developing countries we
must ensure that the benefits of that research are available to the citizens of
that country.
The future will only increase the amount of research that is conducted
abroad, particularly in developing nations. Some of that research is neces-
sary for the health and well-being of the citizens of developing countries.
Some of that research will be performed in developing countries only
because regulatory loopholes make it possible. Without international
cooperation, without concerted action by both developed and developing
countries, those loopholes will remain. A viable and binding international
agreement setting minimum standards for the conduct of research is
needed now. In addition, local or national enforcement mechanisms need
to be implemented in many developing countries and broadened in the
developed countries. Otherwise we risk benefiting from and thereby
encouraging unethical conduct on vulnerable populations.
292. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., BAD MmicIrNE, supra note 1, at 218 (describing the tendency of develop-
ing countries to delay drug approval until a local firm has begun competing production).
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